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Between 2000 and 2005, infrastructure contributed less 
than 1 percentage point to the Central African Republic’s 
annual per capita GDP growth, despite substantial 
spending in the road sector. Raising the country’s 
infrastructure endowment to that of the region’s middle-
income countries could boost annual growth by about 
3.5 percentage points. 
   The CAR has made significant progress in the 
transport, water, power, and information and 
communications technology (ICT) sectors. But the high 
cost of fuel, which raises transportation and energy costs, 
has been a vexing issue across all infrastructure sectors.
   The CAR’s most pressing infrastructural challenge 
lies in the transport sector, which relies heavily on 
neighboring countries and could benefit from improved 
road conditions and enhanced performance at the port 
of Douala in Cameroon. In the power sector, the country 
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suffers from a deteriorating infrastructure stock that it 
can no longer afford to maintain, and an inefficient and 
unreliable power supply. Additional challenges include 
a need for improved infrastructure in the water and 
sanitation and ICT sectors.
   Addressing the CAR’s infrastructure challenges will 
require sustained expenditure of $346 million per year 
over the next decade. The nation already spends around 
$134 million per year on infrastructure, with $37 million 
a year lost to inefficiencies of various kinds. If those 
inefficiencies were fully eliminated, the country’s annual 
infrastructure funding gap would be $183 million per 
year.
   Improvements in funding, coupled with the prospect 
of an economic rebound and prudent policies, could lift 
the country from its fragile state back to and beyond the 
prosperity standards it once enjoyed. 
The Central African Republic’s 
Infrastructure: 
A Continental Perspective 
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Between 2000 and 2005 infrastructure made a modest net contribution of less than 1 percentage point 
to the improved per capita growth performance of the Central African Republic, despite high expenses in 
the road sector. Raising the country’s infrastructure endowment to that of the region’s middle-income 
countries could boost annual growth by about 3.5 percentage points.  
The CAR has made significant progress in some areas of its infrastructure. The country’s road 
network is in relatively good or fair condition and is adequate for traffic levels. Air transport connectivity 
has improved. Also, important reforms providing for the liberalization of the water, power, and 
information and communications technology (ICT) sectors have boosted performance. In particular, 
increased competition in the ICT market has contributed to the rapid expansion of mobile and Internet 
services. 
Unfortunately, there is one vexing issue across all these sectors: the high cost of fuel. Among Central 
African countries, diesel prices are the highest in the CAR. This is due to the high cost—in both money 
and time—incurred by importing oil from Cameroon (via the Doula-Bangui corridor) and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (via the Oubangui River). Higher oil prices raise transportation costs and impact the 
cost of thermal power production. Scarcity of fuel is also responsible for constant power outages as 
thermal production is curtailed, which in turn affects water treatment. 
Looking ahead, the country faces a number of important infrastructure challenges. Probably the 
CAR’s most pressing challenge lies in the transport sector, which depends heavily on the neighboring 
countries. To increase the efficiency of moving goods from and to the CAR, the overall condition of the 
road corridors needs to be improved and the performance of the Port of Doula enhanced. The CAR, in 
conjunction with its neighbors, needs to invest in river transportation. Reducing transportation costs 
would likely impact the price of diesel, with positive effects on the power and water and sanitation 
sectors.  
In the power sector the country is both economically and financially exposed to a deteriorating 
infrastructure stock that the country can no longer afford to maintain, and inefficient and unreliable power 
supply. In the water and sanitation sector, the country needs to improve the quality of its infrastructure to 
expand access to improved water supply and sanitation services, increase consumption per capita, and 
reduce distributional losses, as well as strengthen the operation and financial performance of the Central 
African Water Distribution Corporation (SODECA). Expanding the Internet market, connecting to the 
submarine cable landing in Cameroon, and liberalizing the fixed-line market are the main challenges in 
the ICT sector. 
Addressing the CAR’s infrastructure challenges will require sustained expenditure of $346 million 
per year over the next decade, with heavy emphasis on capital expenditure; almost half of the total relates 
to the transport sector. At 17 percent of the CAR’s 2009 gross domestic product (GDP), this effort is 
almost at the level of other Sub-Saharan African countries.  THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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The CAR already spends around $134 million per year on infrastructure, equivalent to about 7 
percent of its GDP. Almost $37 million a year is lost to inefficiencies of various kinds, associated mainly 
with underpricing in the power, water, and road sectors; poor financial management of utilities; and 
inefficient allocation of resources across sectors. If the CAR could raise the tariffs to cost-recovery levels, 
and manage aligning operational inefficiencies with reasonable developing-country benchmarks, it would 
increase existing flows to the infrastructure sectors. 
Assuming that the inefficiencies are fully captured, comparing spending needs against existing 
spending and potential efficiency gains leaves an annual funding gap of $183 million per year. By far the 
largest gap exists in transport. The CAR has the potential to close this gap by raising additional public 
funding for infrastructure from increased fiscal receipts of various kinds. Furthermore, the CAR has not 
captured as much private finance for infrastructure (measured as a percentage of GDP) as many of its 
neighbors. This scope for improvement, coupled with the prospect of an economic rebound and prudent 
policies, could lift the country from it fragile state back to and beyond the prosperity standards it once 
enjoyed. 
The continental perspective 
The Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) has gathered and analyzed extensive data on 
infrastructure in more than 40 Sub-Saharan countries, including the Central African Republic. The results 
have been presented in reports covering different areas of infrastructure—ICT, irrigation, power, 
transport, water and sanitation—and different policy areas, including investment needs, fiscal costs, and 
sector performance. 
This report presents the key AICD findings for the CAR, allowing the country’s infrastructure 
situation to be benchmarked against that of its African peers. Given that the CAR is a fragile state trying 
to catch up with other low-income countries (LICs) in the region, both fragile-state and LIC African 
benchmarks will be used to evaluate the CAR’s situation. Detailed comparisons will also be made with 
immediate regional neighbors in Central Africa.  
Several methodological issues should be borne in mind. First, because of the cross-country nature of 
data collection, a time lag is inevitable. The period covered by the AICD runs from 2001 to 2009. Most 
technical data presented are for 2008 (or the most recent year available), while financial data are typically 
averaged over the available period to smooth out the effect of short-term fluctuations. Second, to make 
comparisons across countries, indicators were standardized so that analyses were done on a consistent 
basis. This means that some of the indicators presented here may be slightly different from those that are 
routinely reported and discussed at the country level. 
Why infrastructure matters 
Between 2002 and 2009 the CAR’s GDP grew at a rate of 2.2 percent per year. The effect of the 
global economic crisis was notable: the economy grew 3.7 percent in 2007, 2.2 percent in 2008, and 1.7 THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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percent in 2009. Meanwhile, the CAR’s economic performance is less than the 7 percent mark needed to 
make a significant impact on poverty reduction, and below the annual Sub-Saharan African growth of 6.2 
percent. Going forward, average annual real GDP growth for 2009–29 is projected to be 4.4 percent 
provided that there is sustained security and political stability, improvement in the country’s institutional 
and administrative capacity, and appropriate macroeconomic policies (World Bank 2009c).  
The overall contribution of telecommunications, electricity, and road infrastructure to the CAR’s per 
capita growth between 2000 and 2005 was 0.9 percentage points, most of this attributed to a faster 
accumulation of infrastructure assets than to an improvement in infrastructure quality. While this 
contribution seems relatively low, it should be borne in mind that the period analyzed coincides with 
years of conflict. Similar to elsewhere in Africa, the ICT sector was responsible for most of this 
contribution, adding 0.67 percentage points to the per capita growth rate, while the road sector actually 
held back per capita growth by -0.01 percentage points (figure 1a).  
Infrastructure’s contribution in the CAR was lower than in other Central African countries—1.3 
percent for Chad, 1.05 percent for Cameroon, and 0.91 percent for the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Gabon (figure 1a). In the Sub-Saharan African context, infrastructure development led to faster growth 
per capita in Sudan (1.76 percent), Botswana (1.66 percent), Mauritius (1.67 percent), Benin (1.63 
percent), and Uganda (1.54 percent).  
Looking ahead, if the CAR improves its infrastructure to the level of middle-income countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa, growth performance could be enhanced by as much as 3.5 percentage points per capita 
(figure 1b). Most of the potential growth would come from the power sector (1.5 percentage points), in 
particular by increasing generation capacity and national access rates, which as of today are among the 
lowest in the region. ICT would continue making an important contribution to economic prospects (1.05 
percentage points) as long as the expansion of mobile and Internet markets continues. Improving the 
condition of road corridors would facilitate and increase trade with neighbors, boosting economic growth. 
   THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Figure 1. Infrastructure has contributed much to economic growth—but could contribute more 
a. Infrastructure’s contribution to annual per capita economic 
growth in Central African countries, in percentage points, 2001–05 
b. Potential contribution of infrastructure to annual per capita 
economic growth in Central African countries, in percentage points 
   
Source: Calderón 2009. 
The state of the CAR’s infrastructure 
The CAR’s 4.5 million people sparsely populate its 623,000 square kilometers (km²) (figure 2a). Civil 
conflict resulted in significant displacement, including rapid and hazardous urbanization centered on 
Bangui, where economic activity is concentrated and 20 percent of the CAR’s population lives. 
Secondary cities remain relatively small, with fewer than 120,000 inhabitants. At around 7.1 inhabitants 
per km², the CAR’s low population density imposes a big challenge to financing the development of 
infrastructure assets. One solution in the ICT sector is to adapt low-cost technologies, such as WiMax;
1  
meanwhile, water supply services can be expanded via standposts and protected wells.  
Poverty incidence in the CAR is one of the highest in the continent: more than two-thirds of the 
population live below the poverty line. Poverty is higher in rural areas and in regions affected by the civil 
conflict (figure 2b). In the southwest of the country, poverty occurrence is lower, in particular in Bangui, 
where most of the economic activity and infrastructure is concentrated. In 2007 the Participatory Poverty 
Analysis identified poor governance, insecurity, and lack of economic opportunities connected to recent 
conflicts as the three main causes of poverty in the CAR. 
The CAR’s economy is dominated by the primary sector, which accounted for 52 percent of the GDP 
in 2008. In the primary sector, subsistence agriculture represents 28 percent of the GDP, and livestock 
about 13 percent. The country’s main sources of export revenues are timber, cotton, coffee, and extractive 
industries. Timber has accounted for about 16 percent of export earnings, which are small overall. 
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The CAR’s extractive industry potential could be expanded to constitute a solid basis for growth and 
economic diversification. The main potential mining centers—gold, diamonds, uranium, iron, and 
copper— are located in the southwest and central parts of the country (figure 2d). On average, diamonds 
have accounted for about 40 percent of exports.  
The country’s transport infrastructure is very limited, particularly in terms of connecting the country 
internationally (figure 3a). The CAR has only one international airport, located in Bangui but its 
runaways are deteriorated. The country does not have rail infrastructure. In the south west region most of 
the roads are in good condition vis-à-vis the South East and North East regions where the quality is fair or 
poor (figure 3a).  
The CAR has two primary corridors but in practice relies only on one of them. The first is the Doula-
Bangui corridor, through Cameroon, often impassable in the rainy season owing to the poor condition of 
Cameroonian roads. This corridor extends 1,700 km and connects the CAR with the port of Douala in 
Cameroon, the closest port. The other is the Pointe Noire-Brazzaville-Bangui, involving transit down the 
Oubangui River, which is unnavigable in the dry season.  
In the power sector, there are only two transmission lines, connecting Ombella-Mpoko and Bangui, 
and two power plants, Boali 1 and Boali 2 (figure 3b). The CAR’s total installed capacity of 39 
megawatts (MW) needs to be refurbished to either prolong the life of the outdated plant by restoring it to 
full operational status, or to repair generation assets seriously damaged during the civil war. Over 50 
percent of the distribution lines are more than 30 years old.  
Access rates to safe water and sanitation services are among the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 
particular, the CAR relies on low-cost technologies (boreholes and traditional latrines) that frequently fail 
to provide improved water and sanitation. At present there is no sewerage network; and poor drainage 
poses critical health risks, including diarrhea and malaria. Solid waste collection was discontinued during 
the war and needs to be reestablished. 
Reflecting the country’s economic activity and population trends, roads, power, and ICT backbones 
are concentrated in urban areas—Bangui in particular. There is a noticeable lack of infrastructure in rural 
areas. Only Bangui enjoys global system for mobile communications (GSM) coverage (figure 3c), and 
only 8 percent of the population living in urban areas have access to electricity. Meanwhile, urban 
infrastructure requires significant investment as the urban population grows by1.7 percent per year. The 
absence of infrastructure, such as electricity, in rural areas (home to 60 percent of the population) poses a 
particular challenge. THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Figure 2. The Central African Republic is sparsely populated and has a high incidence of poverty  





c. Topography  d. Natural resources 
   
 
 
Source: AICD Interactive Infrastructure Atlas for the CAR (http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/system/files/gha_new_ALL.pdf). THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Figure 3. Infrastructure networks follow population density and natural resources 











Source: AICD Interactive Infrastructure Atlas for the CAR (http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/system/files/gha_new_ALL.pdf). 
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The state of the CAR’s infrastructure and the price of fuel are highly correlated. After a notable 
decline in the retail price of diesel and super gasoline during the mid-1990s, these prices have been 
steadily increasing. In 1998 the price of diesel, at 64 cents per liter, reached its lowest point between 1991 
and 2010. The retail price in 2010 was 169 cents per liter—an increase of about 260 percent (figure 4a). 
Meanwhile, diesel prices in the CAR are the highest in Central Africa (figure 4b). This is due to the high 
cost—in both money and time—incurred by importing oil from Cameroon (via the Doula-Bangui 
corridor) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (via the Oubangui River). Higher oil prices raise 
transportation costs and impact the cost of thermal power production. High power generation costs in turn 
scale up the price of energy, which can only be afforded by the highest quintiles of the population. 
Scarcity of fuel is also responsible for constant power outages as thermal production is curtailed, which in 
turn affects water treatment.  
Figure 4. Diesel and super gasoline retail prices   
a. The CAR’s diesel and super gasoline retail prices   b. Central African countries diesel retail prices 
 
 
Source: GTZ 2008. 
Note: Diesel retail prices for Central African countries as of mid-November 2008. 
 
The CAR’s infrastructure network would benefit from closer interconnection and collaboration with 
neighboring countries. The Central African Backbone has the potential to connect the CAR to the 
submarine cable landing in Cameroon, reducing the cost of telecommunications in the CAR. Upgrading 
the Cameroonian portion of the Bangui-Douala corridor is critical, as it could decrease the time and cost 
of transport goods from the CAR to the port of Douala. As far as the energy sector is concern, estimates 
suggest that as long as the CAR is in a position to develop its own significant domestic hydropower, the 
country will not necessarily benefit from regional trade. 
The main achievements and challenges in each of the CAR’s major infrastructure sectors are 
summarized in table 1. The table outlines the need for upgrading infrastructure in all subsectors, the 
obstacles to enhancing the coverage and quality of infrastructure services, and the ambitious reform 
efforts in this area. In particular, there is a need to improve the operational and financial performance of 
state-owned enterprises (SODECA, ENERCA, and SOCATEL). The following section discusses these 





























































Table 1. Achievements and challenges in various infrastructure sectors 
  Achievements   Challenges 
Surface transport  Relatively good or fair condition of road 
network and selection of surface treatment 
appropiate to traffic levels 
Improving the condition of road corridors 
Diversifying access to sea ports by facilitating river 
transportation 
Reducing transportation costs to further reduce price  of 
diesel 
Air transport  Increased connectivity (that is, number of city 
pairs and traffic) 
Renovation of air fleet 
Opening and expanding the market 
Rehabilitating runways 
Water and sanitation  Sectoral reform, including of national water 
agency  
Improving the quality of water supply and sanitation 
infrastructure to expand access to improved water supply 
and sanitation services, increase consumption per capita, 
and reduce distributional losses 
Strengthening the operation and financial performance of 
SODECA 
Irrigation    Expanding irrigation areas through small-scale projects 
Power  Sectoral reform, providing for market 
liberalization 
Improving the quality of energy infrastructure to expand 
access to power and reduce power outages and 
transmission and distribution losses 
Strengthening the operation and financial performance of 
ENERCA 
ICT  Sectoral reform, providing for market 
liberalization  
Rapid expansion of the mobile market via 
entry of private operators 
Expanding the Internet market and connecting to the 
submarine cable landing in Cameroon 
Liberalizing the fixed-line market 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on findings of this report. 
Note: ICT = information and communications technology.  
Transport 
Transporting goods from and to the CAR is extremely costly and slow. The reduced quality of its 
transport infrastructure and that of its neighbors, compounded with the CAR’s landlocked position, 
imposes higher costs of transporting goods than found in comparable countries with better infrastructure 
or easier access to the coast. The cost associated with exporting or importing a container, at about $5,500 
per container, is the second-highest in Central Africa after Chad. The CAR’s costs of trading across 
borders are above the average of Central African countries, which in fact are higher than in other regions 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. The average time to export and import is 54 and 62 days, respectively (table 2). 
The result is that basic goods are considerably more expensive in the CAR than in the nonlandlocked 
neighboring countries. 
   THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Table 2. Trading across borders in Central African countries 





Time to export 
(days) 






Time to import 
(days) 
Cost to import 
($ per container) 
Burundi  9  47  2,747  10  71  4,285 
Cameroon  11  23  1,379  12  26  1,978 
Central African Republic  9  54  5,491  17  62  5,554 
Chad  6  75  5,902  10  101  8,150 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of  8  44  3,505  9  63  3,735 
Congo, Rep. of  11  50  3,818  10  62  7,709 
Equatorial Guinea  7  29  1,411  7  48  1,411 
Gabon  7  20  1,945  8  22  1,955 
Rwanda  8  35  3,275  8  34  4,990 
São Tomé and Principe  8  27  690  8  29  577 
Central Africa  8  40  3,016  10  52  4,034 
Sub-Saharan Africa  8  32  1,962  9  38  2,492 
Source: World Bank 2010g. 
Note: Documents to export (import): The total number of documents required per shipment to export (import) goods. Documents required 
for clearance by government ministries, customs authorities, port and container terminal authorities, health and technical control agencies, 
and banks are taken into account. 
Time to export (import): The time necessary to comply with all procedures required to export (import) goods. If a procedure can be 
accelerated for an additional cost, the fastest legal procedure is chosen. 
Cost to export (import): The cost associated with all procedures required to export (import) goods. Includes the costs for documents, 
administrative fees for customs clearance and technical control, customs broker fees, terminal-handling charges, and inland transport. 
 
Expensive surface transport costs along the Bangui-Douala corridor account for the bulk of the cost of 
importing to the CAR (figure 5a). Inland transport costs, at about $3,500 to $4,500 per container, account 
for more than 65 percent of the total cost of importing (see table 2). Moving a tonne of freight along 
intraregional corridors in the Central African region
2 costs twice as much (between $230 and $650) as in 
southern Africa region
3 (between $120 and $270), where distances are significantly longer (World Bank 
2010a).  
Surface transport costs are highly impacted by the strong presence of freight bureaus and transport 
associations, which prevent truck operators from contracting with customers directly and result in high 
profit margins for the trucking industry. The regulatory framework, based on market sharing and 
centralized allocation of freight, limits vehicle mileage (to around 2,000 km per month versus 12,000 in 
the developed world) and weakens incentives to invest in service quality upgrades. As a result, the truck 
fleet is largely composed of poorly maintained secondhand trucks that are typically overloaded to obtain 
maximum revenue from their restricted usage. This is a rather serious problem in the region and promotes 
excess supply, with too many vehicles chasing modest freight volumes. 
                                                 
2 Comprising Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. 
3 Comprising Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Lengthy travel times in the Douala-Bangui corridor are mainly associated with inefficient operations 
in the Port of Douala, which is responsible for half of the time required to import to the CAR. 
Productivity measures record poor performance. For example, truck-processing time for the receipt and 
delivery of cargo in the Port of Douala is 14 days versus 7 days for an average port in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Vessel berth productivity, at 12 tonnes per hour in the Port of Douala, is nearly half the Sub-
Saharan African average. Further privatization of the customs clearance system and expansion of the port 
might help improve the performance of the Port of Doula. Time-consuming regulatory processes related 
to customs clearance and technical controls further augment the total time, accounting for about one-third 
of the total time (figure 5b).  
Figure 5. Shares of different components involved in the time and cost of importing through alternative gateways 
a. Cost  b. Time 
   
Source: World Bank 2010a; Teravaninthorn and Raballand 2009. 
Roads 
Challenges 
Road network coverage poses a critical challenge, considering the large size of the CAR and its relatively 
low population. Total road density over arable land is around one-third of the density of low-income, 
fragile countries (41 km compared to 145 km/1,000 km
2). There are only 6 km of roads per 1,000 people. 
The rural network density is even lower, at 25 km/1,000 km
2 (table 3). 
The CAR’s network appears to be in relatively poor condition except for its strategic corridors. The 
condition of the classified paved road network is below the level of comparable peer countries: 62 percent 
is in good or fair condition in the CAR versus 80 percent in fragile states. Meanwhile, it is estimated that 
only 2 percent of the unpaved network is in good or fair condition (table 3). This divergence in the quality 
of paved and unpaved roads can be partially explained by the fact that 75 percent of the resources of the 
Road Fund—most for routine maintenance—are directed to the primary network, which is almost totally 
paved (table 3).  
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Table 3. Road indicators, benchmarked against Sub-Saharan African fragile and low-income countries 
Indicator  Unit 
Fragile 




Road network density [1]  km/1000 km2 of land area  145  41  132 
GIS rural accessibility   % of rural pop within 2 km from all-season road  30  58  23 
Classified paved road network condition [2]  % in good or fair condition  80  62  86 
Classified unpaved road network condition   % in good or fair condition   72  2  56 
Classified paved road traffic  AADT  843  200  1,288 
Classified unpaved road traffic   AADT  31  14  39 
Primary network overengineering  % of primary network asphalted with 300 AADT or less  47  61  30 
Source: AICD Road Sector Database. 
[1] Total network includes the primary, secondary, and tertiary networks. 
[2] Classified roads are those that have been included in the roads legislation as public roads. 
GIS = geographic information system; AADT = average annual daily traffic; the CAR = Central African Republic. 
 
The CAR relies heavily on its regional corridors for the efficient movement of goods and people, but 
its neighbors are not prioritizing the maintenance of their portions of the corridors. The Douala-Bangui 
and Point Noire–Brazzaville–Bangui corridors are still not completely paved. Some sections of the 
Douala-Bangui corridor (about 250 km in Cameroon and 210 km in the CAR) are being upgraded as part 
of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) Transport Transit program. 
Meanwhile, all of Cameroon’s segment of the Point Noire–Brazzaville–Bangui corridor (308 km) is 
unpaved, as is 1,000 km on the Congolese side. This means that the CAR does not have a single all-
weather road corridor to its coastal port gateways (table 4).  
Furthermore, only 48 and 21 percent of the Douala-Bangui and Point Noire–Brazzaville–Bangui 
corridors, respectively, are in good condition. In both cases the problem seems to lie in the coastal 
gateway country’s neglect of road quality. Only 30 percent of the Cameroonian section in the Douala-
Bangui corridor is in good condition, versus 100 percent of the Central African section. Similarly, only 56 
percent of Cameroon’s segment of the Point Noire–Brazzaville–Bangui corridor—and none on the 
Republic of Congo side—is in good condition, whereas 100 percent of the the CAR segment is in good 
condition (table 4). It is worth noting, however, that a good portion of the the CAR segments consist of 
surface treatment pavements that do not have the same properties and durability as asphalt. Around 80 
percent and 35 percent of the CAR’s share of the Point Noire–Brazzaville–Bangui and Douala-Bangui 
corridors, respectively, are surface treated. Clearly, the incentives for a coastal country to maintain 
hinterland road corridors do not seem to be very strong, since coastal countries’ economies are typically 
concentrated along the coast, making the up-country segments regional public goods. 
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Type (%)  Condition (%) 
Average annual daily traffic 
(%) 
Paved  Unpaved  Good  Fair  Poor  <300 
300–
1,000  >1,000 
Douala to Bangui  1,704  69  31  48  25  25  65  20  15 
Cameroon  1,118  52  48  30  36  35  53  24  23 
Central African Republic [1]  587  100  0  100  0  0  86  14  0 
Pointe Noire to Brazzaville to 
Bangui  2,419  40  54  21  21  49  27  11  0 
Cameroon  311  0  100  56  39  0  70  24  0 
Central African Republic [1]  535  99  1  100  0  0  79  19  0 
Congo, Rep. of  1,573  28  63  0  21  69  0  6  0 
Source: AICD calculations. 
Note: The summation of the good, fair, and poor conditions does not necessarily add up to 100 since there might be some links of the network 
for which the condition is unknown. 
The summation of the paved and unpaved type does not necessarily add up to 100 since there might be some links of the network for which 
the type is unknown. 
[1] Asphalt and surface treatment pavements are considered paved roads. 
 
The relatively poor condition of the corridors in the coastal countries calls for further regional 
coordination and collaboration. The adoption of the Trade and Transport Facilitation Program by the 
CEMAC (Economic Community of Central African States) member states points in this direction. The 
program comprises the implementation of a regional institutional framework, harmonization of national 
regulations, regional interconnectivity of customs information technology systems, and implementation of 
a pilot trade and transport facilitation project on the Bangui-Douala (about 1,450 km) and N’Djamena-
Douala (about 1,850 km) surface transport corridors.  
Road financing in the CAR is a major challenge. At 10 cents per liter (figure 6), the CAR fuel levy is 
among the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa covering routine maintenance needs and 25 percent of the total 
maintenance requirements. Existing fuel levy represents around 7 percent of the retail diesel and super 
gasoline prices. AICD estimations suggest that CAR is spending on maintenance and rehabilitation 
around 55 percent and 10 percent less than required, respectively. 
Despite the implementation of road user charges, public funding to finance the road sector is still 
likely to be needed. The challenge is large due to the poor budgetary situation of the government and the 
high volatility of transfers in recent years. In 2001 central transfers accounted for 56 percent of the Road 
Fund’s total revenue; in 2003 this was 71 percent, and in 2006 only 26 percent.  
But estimates suggest that low execution ratios are an important source of inefficiency in the road 
sector. In fact, the road sector received $54 million on average per year from the public sector, out of 
which $9 million was lost due to low budget execution. This means that budgeted capital spending is 
typically 16 percent higher than what the CAR actually succeeds in spending. If rehabilitation 
requirements are compared to an estimate of budgeted (versus actual) capital spending, then the funding 
situation looks somewhat more positive. Thus, improving capital budget execution is an important first 
step toward clearing rehabilitation backlogs. In Sub-Saharan Africa the evidence shows that the main 
causes of low budget execution are weaknesses and delays in the public procurement process that prevent THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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contracts from being awarded and completed within a 12-month budget cycle (Gwilliam and others 
2009). 
Figure 6. Optimal and existing fuel levy in select Sub-Saharan African countries 
 
Source: Gwillliam and others 2009. 
 
Traffic levels are extremely low, making it difficult to justify heavy road engineering. Traffic, mainly 
concentrated in the Bangui-Douala and Point Noire–Brazzaville–Bangui corridors, consists of 200 
vehicles per day on the paved segments. This is only 25 percent of the average—843 vehicles per day—in 
the fragile countries and 15 percent of the average—1,288 vehicles per day—in low-income countries. 
The volume of traffic in the CAR’s unpaved network is also low, with only 14 vehicles per day versus 31 
vehicles per day on average for comparable fragile states (table 4). Around 86 percent of the traffic in the 
the CAR section of the Douala-Bangui corridor consists of fewer than 300 vehicles per day, the estimated 
minimum economic threshold for paving. In the case of the Point Noire–Brazzaville–Bangui corridor, 
about 80 percent of the traffic in the CAR’s section consists of fewer than 300 vehicles per day. With 61 
percent of the primary network under asphalt and an average annual daily traffic of below 300 vehicles, 
the CAR’s level of overengineering is 47 percent higher than in comparable fragile states (table 3). 
Nevertheless, due to recent conflict it may be that traffic volumes are artificially depressed due to security 
concerns. 
Primary and secondary networks have been sensitive to this reality by adopting lower-cost surfacing. 
The CAR’s total road network, consisting of 25,235 km, is largely surface treated, both pavement (63 
percent) and gravel (34 percent). The primary or national network (about 5,000 km) consists of mainly 
surface treatment pavement (4,322 km) and asphalt (654 km), and represents about 20 percent of the total 
network. The secondary or regional network primarily consists of surface treatment pavement (4,364 km) 
and gravel roads (589 km). The tertiary or rural network (about 15,000 km) consists of 100 percent gravel 
roads. Adopting more appropriate standards would reduce the costs of network maintenance and ease the 































The river transport subsector remains an important and indispensable mode of transport and promises to 
open up the Central African Republic. However, navigability is limited throughout the 5,000 km 
waterway network—only 2,067 km are navigable for four months a year, mainly on the Bangui-
Brazzaville corridor (1,195 km). The Congo and Ubangi rivers are the traditional routes for the export of 
products, and once provided a cost-effective transport artery for timber from the CAR. Because of civil 
conflict in the CAR and the Republic of Congo in the past decade, however, routes through Cameroon 
became preferred by importers and exporters. Traffic decreased sharply, especially timber exports, 
although the river is still used to import petroleum products during the navigable season (figure 7). 
Figure 7. River traffic, 1980–2006 
 
Source:  World Trade Organization 2007. 
 
Still, river transportation remains a highly competitive mode of transport: costs average $0.05 per 
tonne-km. And since the peace process got under way in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the river 
has once again become an option for the lower-cost shipping of imports and exports to and from the CAR. 
For imports, the river route takes longer (12–15 days from Brazzaville or Kinshasa), but the cost of 
transport is 20 to 60 percent less (World Trade Organization 2007). The river’s unreliable navigability, 
however, reduces the benefits of its low costs (Briceño-Garmendia and Pushak 2010).  
In this context, investments in the regular dredging of sand from the Congo and Ubangi rivers could 
make them accessible all year round to the Pointe Noire–Brazzaville–Bangui corridor. According to the 
Republic of Congo National Transport Plan estimates, the investment required to dredge the Sangha and 
Ubangui tributaries of the Congo River is roughly $30 million (Briceño-Garmendia and Pushak 2010). 
The rehabilitation of the Salo and Amont ports is also fundamental to boosting river transit. In the long 
term, building a dam at Palambo to regulate the upstream flow of the Oubangui Bangui (at Zawara, THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Palambo, or Longo) will make it navigable from 11 to 12 months a year (Minist￨re de l’Economie, du 
Plan et de la Coopération international 2007). More intensive use of the river for transporting goods and 
passengers means replacing the SOCRATAF’s
4 equipment, which is ongoing following its recent 
privatization. 
Restoring the navigability of the Congo and Ubangi rivers would make the port of Pointe Noire an 
alternative to the Port of Douala for the CAR trade, through a combination of river and rail transport 
using the CFCO
5 line from Brazzaville to Point Noire. In fact, Point Noire is one of the best-performing 
ports in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Republic of Congo is one of the few countries in Africa that has 
developed a national port master plan (see box 1).
6  
For the CAR to benefit from the potential offered by the port of Pointe Noire and river transport 
(Minist￨re de l’Economie, du Plan et de la Coop￩ration international 2007), measures to improve the 
entire corridor (including improvements in navigability of the Congolese river stretches, rehabilitation of 
the CFCO railways, improvements in the port of Point Noire, and rehabilitation of the Cameroonian and 
Congolese road sections of the Pointe Noire–Brazzaville–Bangui corridor) would need to be closely 
coordinated with the Republic of Congo and Cameroon. 
Box 1. The CAR could benefit from the development of transport corridors in the Republic of Congo 
Tapping the potential for developing transport infrastructure in the Republic of Congo would mean taking 
advantage of multimodal transport corridors that already exist. Once the road and rail corridor to Brazzaville are 
operating normally, the port of Pointe Noire should be able to capture the Republic of Congo’s imports and 
exports, particularly timber, now diverted to other ports in West Africa, such as the Port of Doula in Cameroon 
and the Port of Matadi in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  
If the Republic of Congo were successful in reestablishing a transit role, traffic and associated transport 
revenues at Pointe Noire could double. In an optimistic scenario, the Republic of Congo would essentially 
double the existing imports and the export of timber going through Pointe Noire—from around 1 million tonnes 
of imports and exports each to around 2 million tonnes. The overall value of traded goods would also double, 
from $3.3 to $6.6 billion per year, as would the associated transportation revenues, from $135 to $278 million 
per year. 
Source: World Bank 2010b.  
Air transport 
Achievements 
After years of decline, the CAR’s air transport traffic and connectivity are recovering. Between 2001 
and 2007 the number of total seats declined from144,991 to 44,503 due, in part, to the collapse of Air 
Afrique and Cameroon Airlines, the latter serving the market since 2004. The greatest downturn took 
place in the number of international seats, which fell from 118,122 in 2001 to 20,661 in 2007. Estimated 
                                                 
4 Société Centrafricaine des Transports Fluviaux. 
5 Chemin de Fer Congo Ocean. 
6 The Port Authority of the Republic of Congo has developed a national port master plan and secured commitments 
of $798 million in private investment to double the current 17-hectare container facility and double the existing 
annual throughput capacity of 300,000 20-foot equivalent units (TEUs) within 8 years. The port investment program 
also includes deepening the port to accommodate vessels of up to 6,000 TEU, rehabilitating wharfs and warehouses, 
constructing drainage and electricity supply networks, and creating a timber yard (World Bank 2010b).  THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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figures for 2009 show that the total number of seats grew by about 50 percent compared to 2007 levels. In 
particular, the international seats more than doubled between 2007 and 2009 (figure 8a). Connectivity is 
recovering, evident in the increase in city pairs being served within Africa. Between 2001 and 2007, the 
city pairs served dropped from 11 to 3. Preliminary numbers show that in 2009 city pairs went up to 6 
(figure 8b).  
Figure 8. Evolution of seats and city pairs in the Central African Republic 
a. Seats  b. City pairs 
   
Source: Bofinger 2009. Derived from the AICD national database (http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data). 
Note: As reported to international reservation systems 
 
Carriers in the CAR are using modernized air fleets. Air France and Libya’s Air Afriquia, the only air 
carriers in the CAR, have modernized 100 percent of their fleets, and as of today, the CAR is served by 
the newest fleet in the region (table 5). 




Republic  Chad 
Congo, 
Dem. 
Rep. of  Cameroon  Niger 
Congo, Rep. 
of 
Domestic seats (seats per year)  —  —  327,988  105,742  —  443,634 
Seats for international travel within Africa (seats per year)  20,661  109,074  468,217  472,089  128,414  351,882 
Seats for intercontinental travel (seats per year)  23,842  88,608  193,414  398,034  41,717  117,962 
Seats available per capita  0.010  0.018  0.016  0.051  0.012  0.24 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index—air transport market (%)  50.26  36.35  22.65  10.18  18.97  30.79 
Percent of seat-km in newer aircraft   100  99.5  74.7  91.8  94.3  73.3 
Percent of seat-km in medium or smaller aircraft  23.5  93.6  39.3  31.9  44.9  50.5 
Percent of carriers passing IATA/IOSA audit  0  0  0  0  0  0 
FAA/IASA audit status  No audit  No audit  Failed  No audit  No audit  No audit 
Source: Bofinger 2009. All data as of 2007 based on estimations and computations of scheduled advertised seats, as published by the Diio 
SRS Analyzer. This captures 98 percent of worldwide traffic, but a higher percentage of African traffic is not captured by the data. 
Note: The Herfindhal-Hirschmann Index (HHI) is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. It is calculated by squaring the 
market share of each firm competing in the market and then summing the resulting numbers. A HHI of 100 indicates the market is a monopoly; 
the lower the HHI, the more diluted the market power exerted by one company/agent.  
FAA = U.S. Federal Aviation Administration; IASA = International Aviation Safety Assessment; IATA = International Air Transport Association; 
IOSA = IATA International Safety Audit. 
— = Data not available. 

















































Despite the recent turnaround, capacity and connectivity remain low in relative terms due to poor 
infrastructure and small market size. Of the 42 airport platforms, only four runaways are paved (Bangui, 
Berberati, and Bobangui Avakaba). The Bangui-M’Poko airport requires major investments: its paved 
runaway has not been reinforced since 1987. Also, the expansion and redevelopment of the terminal and 
the provision of equipment safety and security (such as fencing around the airport) are urgent necessities 
(Minist￨re de l’Economie, du Plan et de la Coop￩ration international 2007). 
Compared to other Central African peers, the CAR reported the lowest numbers of seats for 
international travel within Africa and for intercontinental travel, and its seat capacity per capita is among 
the lowest in the region (table 1). The type and condition of air transport infrastructure constrain the 
expansion of the market. The infrastructure includes basic, rudimentary airstrips in remote towns, such as 
Birao in the north, Obo near the eastern border, and the main airport in Bangui. These factors are 
compounded by high poverty prevalence, which makes harder for users to afford air fares, and low 
population density, which imposes greater cost for infrastructure expansion. 
The number of city pairs served in the CAR is very low, which manifests itself in the frequency of 
flights. In 2009 the average number of international flights from North Africa landing in Bangui was two 
per week; the sole intercontinental connection, via Air France, saw one flight per week. Including the 1.4 
flights per week from other Sub-Saharan countries, on average there were fewer than 5 flights per week 
connecting the CAR to the rest of the world as of 2009. The entrance of new airlines to the market—such 
as Ethiopian Airlines, Kenya Airlines, Inter Air, Royal Air Maroc, and TAAG—most likely has 
augmented the number of flights per week over the past two years.  
Water resources 
The CAR has important sources of water. There are two river basins: the Ubangi and Chari. Two-
thirds of the country lies in the basin of the Ubangi River, which flows south into the Congo River, while 
the remaining third lies in the basin of the Chari River, which flows north into Lake Chad. The water 
potential, however, is worrisome, as the volume of water in these basins has declined steadily from year 
to year. The quality of surface water is also deteriorating, especially that from the rivers, springs, ponds, 
and traditional wells that provide drinking water to around 70 percent of the population. 
The renewable water resources per capita are estimated at about 36,912 cubic meters per year 
(m
3/year) (including cross-border flows), which is above the Sub-Saharan African average of 7,000 
m
3/year. Rainfall averages 1,343 millimeter per year (mm/year), but levels vary considerably across 
regions and over the course of the year.  
There are several factors that put significant pressure on water resources. Agricultural production 
needs—representing 77 percent of the total water use—add to the stress, in particular for cotton 
production. Domestic demand—representing 18 percent of total water use—has increased over time, but 
access to clean water remains a major challenge for the population. The millennium goal of reducing the 
proportion of people without access to drinking water or safe sanitation by half will not be achieved for 
either the urban or the rural areas. The industrial sector—accounting for 5 percent of total water use—is 




The irrigation potential in the CAR is substantial. Only 135 of a potential 1.9 million hectares are 
irrigated (see figure 3d) (FAO 2004).  The irrigated area could be increased substantially with good 
economic returns. Simulations suggest that with a threshold internal rate of return (IRR) of 6 percent it 
would be economically viable to develop 6,048 hectares of land for irrigation through small-scale 
projects. If the threshold IRR is raised to 12 percent, the economically viable area for irrigation shrinks to 
1,824 hectares. The required investment for attaining this expansion is $9 million (table 6). Large-scale 
projects do not appear to be economically viable in the CAR at any rate of return. 
Table 6. Irrigation potential for small-scale projects 
Cutoff  Investment  Internal rate of return  Area increase 
(%)  $million  %  hectares 
0  68  4.0  13,065 
6  31  10.0  6,048 
12  9  0.0  1,824 
24  0  0.0  0 
Source: Derived from You and others (2009). 
Note: Water for irrigation can be collected in two ways: through large, dam-based schemes or through small projects based on 
the collection of runoffs from rainfall. The investment costs of large-scale irrigation development reflect only irrigation-specific 
infrastructure, such as distribution canals and on-farm system development. The potential for small-scale irrigation is assessed 
not only on the basis of agroecological conditions, but also in terms of market access, since irrigation is typically viable only if the 
increased yields can be readily marketed. The unit cost for large-scale projects is set at $3,000/hectare and for small-scale 
projects at $2,000/hectares. 
Water supply and sanitation 
Achievements 
Since the end of the conflict, the CAR has made important efforts to improve the institutional and 
legal framework of the water supply and sanitation sectors. In 2006 the Water Code was promulgated and 
the Government’s Policy and Strategy Paper on the National Water and Sanitation Program (NESP) was 
approved, and in 2007 the National Agency for Water and Sanitation was established. But a clear 
definition of responsibilities among the different actors in the water supply and sanitation sectors is 
pending. 
The CAR has managed to reach people with some form of water supply and sanitation, as shown by 
the relatively low reliance on surface water and open defecation. According to the results of the 2006 
Multiple Indicator Survey (box 2), the CAR’s reliance on surface water is only one-third of the average 
for fragile states, which in fact do better than other low-income countries. In particular, due to the rapid 
expansion of utility connections in urban centers since the end of the conflict, it is expected that the use of 
surface water has decreased further in recent years. Reliance on open defecation in the CAR is at the level 
of other fragile countries. 
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Box 2. How different are estimates from households surveys compared to government data? 
The Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) uses the Joint Monitoring Data (JMP) coverage statistics 
as the main source of access data on water supply and sanitation and processes these using a standardized 
methodology to allow cross-country comparisons by technology rather than by improved or unimproved water 
supply or sanitation. These data might differ from those reported by governments. Whereas the JMP data are 
based on household surveys and therefore reported by users of the services, the government data are based on 
other methodologies. The CAR’s Directorate General of Water (DGH) calculates access by technology, 
multiplying the number of existing water or sanitation assets (functional or not functional) by a norm of how 
many people are served by each point. In the CAR the DGH data do not take into account population 
projections. The DGH estimated that by the end of 2009 there were 3,200 water points in the CAR. In 2010 the 
Water and Sanitation Public Expenditure Review estimated that for 2008 the access rate to safe water was 20 
percent in rural areas, assuming 300 users per water point, 25 percent nonfunctioning water points, and 2.5 
percent annual population growth. 
Other factors underlying these potential differences include the definition of which technologies constitute 
improved access to water supply and sanitation, and the JMP’s use of several household surveys vis-à-vis the 
use of a single data point by several governments. Therefore, measures of progress toward the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and of the spending needed to achieve them might differ according to the data 
source used. 
Source: AICD and World Bank 2010b. 
Challenges 
The vast majority of the population is barely on the first rung of the water and sanitation ladder with 
major concerns about quality of service. 
Around 70 percent of the population relies on wells and boreholes as the main source of water 
(table 7), above the average reliance seen in comparable fragile states. The condition of the CAR’s wells 
and boreholes in many cases does not guarantee the provision of safe water. As of 2004 only 10 percent 
of the wells were disinfected on a regular basis, and the water was safe in only 47 percent of the cases, 
according to the Ministry of Heath. Furthermore, 92.3 percent of urban households and 98.4 percent of 
rural households reported not using any form of water treatment (ICASEES 2009). The challenge of 
improving the quality of water is more pressing when one considers that around one-fourth of the 
boreholes are out of service and that on average they provide water to 1,500 to 2,000 people—many more 
than the government’s norm of 300 people.  
There is a wide disparity in access to safe water between rural and urban populations. At 52 percent 
of the population, urban access to standposts is 10 times higher than rural access, and at 43 percent, urban 
reliance on wells and boreholes is half of the level in rural areas (figure 9a). In rural areas, 95 percent of 
the water comes from boreholes with hand pumps (World Bank, 2010g). If one considers that only 10 
percent of the water coming from wells and boreholes is safe, only 14 percent of the rural population has 
access to safe water versus 61 percent in urban areas. In addition, 43 percent of rural households spend 
between 30 minutes and 1 hour walking to fetch water versus 25 percent of their urban peers (and water is 
carried by women 74 percent of the time) (World Bank, 2010g).  
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Republic     
Low-income 
countries 
    Mid-2000s  1994  2000  2006  Mid-2000s 
Access to piped water  % pop  17.9  2  3  2  9.3 
Access to standposts  % pop  9.4  15  19  23  17.1 
Access to wells/boreholes  % pop  54.5  73  68  70  39.3 
Access to surface water  % pop  18.1  10  9  5  34.2 
Access to septic tanks  % pop  11.2  1  1  2  4.7 
Access to improved latrines  % pop  29.0  24  24 
76 
18.3 
Access to traditional latrines  % pop  36.8  42  51  38.5 
Open defecation  % pop  23.1  33  24  23  38.3 
      2000  2005  2009   
Domestic water consumption  liter/capita/day  29.6  —  6.3  6.5  50.9 
Revenue collection  % sales  94.6  61  61  86  94.1 
Distribution losses  % production  31.5  39  53  51  34.8 
Cost recovery  % total costs  57.2  —  46  —  89.5 
Operating cost recovery  % operating costs  80.1  —  64  —  125.2 
Labor costs  connections per 
employee  168.8  63  49  62  175.9 
Total hidden costs as % of revenue  %  169  185  187  148  67 
   






Average effective tariff  U.S. cents per m3  57  57  80  3.0–60.0 
Source: AICD water supply and sanitation database (http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data). 
Access figures calculated by the AICD using data from Demographic and Health Survey (1994) and Multiple Indicators Cluster Surveys (2000 
and 2006), as published by the WHO/Joint Monitoring Program (JMP) in March 2010. 
Note: Domestic water consumption is calculated as a weighted average of the consumption in Bangui and seven other centers served by 
SODECA. A country is considered to have non-scarce water resources if the renewable internal freshwater resources per capita are greater 
than 3,000 millimeters. 
m3 = cubic meters. 
= Data not available. 
 
More than three-fourths of the population relied on latrines as of 2006, but due to data constraints and 
the difficulty of tracking investments made by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), it is not possible 
to make a clear separation between improved and traditional latrines. In rural areas, it is mainly VIP 
latrines or septic sanplat or double-vented types that are installed by NGOs. Devices for handwashing 
have been installed in community centers by the Department of Health and NGOs working in the sector 
(World Bank, 2010g). After 2006 a substantial number of households had access to shared latrines 
constructed by humanitarian agencies.
7  
   
                                                 
7 Shared latrines have expanded dramatically in recent years: 27 new shared latrines were built in 2007, 5,352 in 
2008, and 1,527 in 2009 (World Bank 2010g).  THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Figure 9. Urban versus rural access to water supply and sanitation, 2006 
a. Water supply  b. Sanitation  
   
Source: AICD water supply and sanitation utilities database (http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data). 
Access figures calculated by the AICD using data from the 2006 Multiple Indicators Cluster Surveys published by the JMP in March 2010. 
ß 
Availability of utility water in urban areas is extremely low relative to subsistence benchmarks, partly 
due to deficiencies in water treatment infrastructure. Domestic water consumption is on average 6.5 liters 
per capita per day, an insufficient amount to satisfy absolute subsistence at 25 liters per capita per day and 
only one-fifth of the average consumption of other fragile, rich countries (table 7). Whereas in Bangui the 
consumption is around 10 liters per day, in the other seven urban centers served by SODECA the daily 
consumption is limited to 5 liters. It is estimated that only 21 percent and 4 percent of the population 
living in Bangui and the other seven urban centers, respectively, consume the levels required to satisfy 
basic needs (World Bank 2010g). In view of the insufficient supply of water, there is an urgent need to 
secure access to chemicals and power for treatment (factors that have contributed to water shortages in the 
past), as well as to expand the existing treatment capacity, which is inadequate. During the conflict, prices 
of chemicals for water treatment went up following scarcity. In December 2004 Bangui suffered a total 
cut of its supply for several days following the delay of an order for chemicals needed to treat raw water. 
Water supply in the capital depends heavily on expensive electricity produced by ENERCA—itself in a 
difficult situation—so an energy blackout could stop the supply of drinking water in Bangui in six hours 
(COWI 2007). A majority of the urban centers served by SODECA have experienced pipe breaks in the 
water network, lasting a few weeks to several months (World Bank 2010g). 
The CAR’s provision of utility water is critically affected by SODECA’s inefficiencies. It is 
particularly striking that the utility is losing half the treated water in the network when there is such a 
shortage of treated water to distribute. Distributional losses are not only more than twice as high as those 
of a well-performing utility, but also among the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite an important 
improvement in collection ratios, SODECA has recovered only 86 percent of the total billing in 2009, 
which does not compare favorably with utilities in fragile states. At 62 connections per employee, labor 
productivity is less than half the average productivity of a utility in fragile states and below the 
benchmark of 200 connections per employee calculated for a well-run utility in Africa. With an average 
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effective tariff (at 57 cents/m
3)—below the average total cost (at 119 cents/m
3)—calls for the introduction 
of mechanisms to get consumers to contribute more to the utilities’ financial sustainability. 
















m3/year)  (%)  (%)  ($/m3)  ($/m3)  ($ million/year)  (% revenues ) 
2000  8.2  39  61  0.87  0.44  4  185 
2001  8.3  40  61  0.88  0.42  4  199 
2002  9.0  45  61  0.85  0.45  4  185 
2003  8.9  44  61  0.91  0.45  5  203 
2004  9.3  53  61  1.09  0.64  5  214 
2005  9.3  53  61  1.09  0.57  5  187 
2006  10.0  48  61  1.01  0.57  5  177 
2007  9.9  52  67  1.11  0.57  6  164 
2008  9.9  51  83  1.11  0.57  5  166 
2009  9.3  51  86  1.11  0.57  5  148 
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009). 
 
Cost recovery may be complicated by the dominance of flat-rate tariff. Water from kiosks is priced at 
207 CFA francs/m
3 (or 44 cents) and has not been adjusted since 1998. Moreover, revenue collection 
from private taps represents less than a tenth of the customer base. Also, the government represents 
around 35 percent of the total consumption but is unlikely to pay for months or years. On average, 
between 2002 and 2008 the arrears accounted for about $7 million, more than twice the utility’s revenue 
for 2008. 
Despite recent improvements, hidden costs remain very high relative to benchmarks. Comparing the 
key performance indicators available for the CAR against those of a well-performing utility provides a 
quantified, monetary value of the major inefficiencies affecting the sector. Here three types of hidden 
costs are considered: first, losses on the water distributional network above the norm of 20 percent of 
production (losses); second, an inability to collect 100 percent of bills (collection inefficiencies); and, 
third, an average effective tariff that is not high enough to cover the cost of producing a cubic meter of 
water (underpricing).  
The AICD calculations estimated SODECA’s hidden costs at 185 percent of its revenues in 2000, 
with underpricing accounting for half of the total. Hidden costs reached a maximum of 214 percent of the 
revenues in 2004, when distributional losses were the highest in the decade, at 53 percent of the 
production (figure 10a). Since 2005, estimated hidden costs decreased due to improvements in the 
collection ratio and a decrease in nonrevenue water. But as the average effective tariffs have remained at 
57 cents/m
3, the hidden costs have been driven by underpricing (table 8). Whereas in 2005, SODECA’s 
hidden costs were above the average level for utilities in the Central African region (below 150 percent of 
revenues), as of 2009 SODECA’s hidden costs were at the same level of other utilities in Central Africa 
(figure 10b). THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Figure 10. The hidden costs of water supply, as a percentage of revenue 
a. Evolution of hidden costs in SODECA  b. Hidden costs of select water utilities 
   
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009). 
Power 
Achievements 
Important reforms in the CAR’s energy sector have been implemented, including market 
liberalization allowing participation of the private sector. But as of today there is only one operator in the 
power sector (ENERCA), which produces, distributes, and markets electricity throughout the country. A 
newly appointed electricity regulator (ARSE) was created, but its capacity is still limited.  
Challenges 
Years of sociopolitical crisis in the CAR have left the power infrastructure in an embryonic state. Total 
installed capacity in the CAR is 39 MW, one of the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa. But the limited 
infrastructure available is decaying due to scarce maintenance and needs to be completed refurbished. 
Half of the assets are more than 30 years old. The installed capacity, at 10 MW per million people, is half 
the average of low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (table 9). The limited generation capacity 
consists of Boali 1 and Boali 2—the two main hydropower plants—with a capacity of 14.9 MW each, a 
diesel plant in Bangui with a capacity of 6 MW, an interconnected grid between Boali and Bangui that 
carries 34 MW of generated power, and a small distribution network. In 2007 the government started 
construction of Boali 3, an additional 10 MW hydropower plant that is not yet operational.  
Further limitations derive from aging infrastructure stock and the pilfering of power equipment. There 
are frequent breakdowns at power plants, which reduce the supply of already-scarce energy resources—as 
happened in 2008, when the country faced a power crisis. Boali 2 has been plagued by breakdowns of its 
power turbines and lost half its generation capacity due to technical failures. Theft of grounding 
equipment for light has made the transmission network more vulnerable to forces of nature and severely 
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Table 9. Power indicators, benchmarked against select groups of countries 
     




Access (national)  % of population  1  15  33  50 
Access (urban)  % of population  10*  58  86  101 
Access (rural)  % of population  0  4  4  32 
Installed generation 
capacity   MW per million people 
10  46  20  799 
Electricity consumption  kWh/capita  27  165  107  4,479 
Power outages  Days/year  40  11  10  6 
Collection rate  % of billing  69  34  92  91 
Cost-recovery ratio   % of total costs  75  100  89  85 
Revenue per unit  U.S. cents per kWh  13  3  14  13 
System losses  % generation  48  40  24  20 
Total hidden costs   % revenue  167  443  69  0.1 
U.S. cents     
CAR 
Predominantly 
hydro  Other developing regions  
Effective power tariff  Residential at 100 kWh  15  10.27 
5.0–10.0  Effective power tariff  Commercial at 100 kWh    11.73 
Effective power tariff  Industrial at 50,000 kWh    11.39 
Sources: Fragile and nonfragile countries’ figures as of 2005, calculated using the AICD power database 
(http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data), which contains household data. For the CAR, national access is for 2009 (World Bank 
2009g), electricity consumption is for 2007 (CIA World Fact Book 2010); power outages are for 2005 (Rosnes and Vennemo 2009); collection 
ratio is for 2010 (World Bank 2010c); cost-recovery ratio is for 2009 (World Bank 2009f); system losses are for 2009 (ENERCA 2010); effective 
tariff is for 2008 (World Bank 2009f). 
Note: Urban access for the CAR represents access to electricity in Bangui. 
kWh = kilowatt-hour; MW = megawatts. 
 
Thermal generation is curtailed by the expensive price of diesel in the CAR. The routes used to 
transport fuel are expensive,
8 increasing the price of oil in the CAR. At 144 cents per liter of diesel, in 
2008 the CAR paid 40 cents more for fuel than Cameroon and 23 cents more than the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (GTZ 2008). This situation has affected secondary centers that rely on thermal sources 
for power. Further, Bangui’s diesel plant is often strapped for funds and finds itself unable to pay for fuel, 
limiting power availability.  
The limited availability of power translates into poor access to electricity. As of 2009 only 1 percent 
of the CAR’s population had access to electricity compared to 33 percent in low-income countries (table 
9). Urban access, at 10 percent and mainly concentrated in Bangui, is just one-ninth of the average access 
in urban areas found in other low-income countries. No one in rural areas benefits from electrification. 
Households in the CAR rely on firewood or fuel oil as the main source of energy for domestic 
                                                 
8 There are two main routes used to transport fuel. The first is a more costly and poor-quality overland route from 
Cameroon. The second is from Kinshasa. One-fifth of CAR’s oil is supplied from the Democratic Republic of 
Congo via the Oubangui River. River transit was also affected by tensions along the border that disrupted the supply 
of oil (EIU 2007).  THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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consumption (EIU 2007). Very low population densities in the CAR impose a substantial challenge to 
expanding access to power. 
Consumption of electricity in the CAR is a fraction of its African peers. The available electricity is 
erratic and unreliable; leading to an estimated 11 gigawatt-hour (GWh) suppressed demand (that is, the 
difference between so-called notional demand and availability at the going price). Outages in 2006 lasted 
as much as 950 hours during the year, with an average duration of 5.2 hours (Rosnes and Vennamo 2009). 
Load shedding cut off power as much as 8 hours a day in 2008 and has reportedly increased to 13.5 hours 
a day on average (World Bank 2010c). Secondary centers in rural areas are powered by expensive diesel 
generation (Bernard Kief Consultants 2006).  
Limited power availability has wider repercussions throughout the economy. Connecting to the grid is 
expensive, and firms—most of which are small and informal—wait around 7 months to get a connection 
to electricity (World Bank 2011b). Obtaining a power connection costs around 52 times the average 
yearly income per capita in the CAR.
9 Firms’ efficiency is handicapped by chronic power shortages and 
frequent outages, and they have to rely on their own expensive generators. During the power crisis of 
2008, power shortages badly impacted SODECA, the CAR’s water utility, as it was unable to pump water 
in some neighborhoods. Hospitals were also impacted by the lack of power. Bangui is said to have come 
close to facing a serious humanitarian crisis. Meanwhile, the creditworthiness of both the government and 
sector has deterred investments in the sector. Inadequate resources to reestablish reliable power supply 
around Bangui—coupled with faulty generation equipment that frequently breaks down, and ENERCA’s 
inability to cover its costs—have led the government to appeal to the international community for 
resources to rehabilitate the power infrastructure. 
The CAR will need to develop 143 MW of additional capacity to fully meet growing demand over the 
next 10 years.
10 But after the development of Boali 3, the next available plant at Palambo is a full 300 
MW site that would require huge investment ($450 million) to develop and would likely support excess 
capacity for some time. Initial estimates suggest that it might not be possible to export this power, 
although this possibility would need to be further explored. Another option would be to link the 
development of the power plant to the expansion of the mining activities in the country. 
The CAR’s power sector is critically affected by ENERCA’s poor performance, a public enterprise 
characterized by enormous system losses (both technical and nontechnical in nature), an inability to 
recover operational and capital costs, and low revenue collection rates. 
On average a staggering 50 percent of the generated power in the system has been lost every year 
since 2006. Around 35 percent of the power is lost due to nontechnical factors such as theft. Illegal users 
                                                 
9 Doing Business 2011 (World Bank 2011, http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/getting-electricity). The 
cost to obtain a connection is recorded as a percentage of average income per capita. Costs are recorded exclusive of 
value added tax. All the fees and costs associated with completing the procedures to connect a warehouse to 
electricity are recorded, including those related to obtaining clearances from government agencies, applying for the 
connection, receiving inspections of both the site and the internal wiring, purchasing material, getting the actual 
connection works, and paying a security deposit. Information from local experts and specific regulations and fee 
schedules are used as sources for costs. If several local partners provide different estimates, the median reported 
value is used. In all cases the cost excludes bribes. 
10 These represent investments in the Palambo and Boali 3 plants.  THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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make temporary connections of power at night to avoid detection during the day. The remaining 15 
percent of the system losses are due to technical issues. Distribution cables in Bangui are over 40 years 
old and are made of bare copper. The copper is a rather attractive commodity for looters, and aging cables 
have been an easy target for illegal connections.  
Despite relatively high tariffs, ENERCA has not been able to recover its total cost of production. At 
15 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh), the CAR’s consumers pay higher prices than consumers in other 
African countries that generate power from hydro resources (figure 11). High prices are driven up further 
by the high costs often associated with the small scale of production, escalation of fuel prices, and regular 
breaks of the power infrastructure. Historically, ENERCA has only recovered 75 percent of its total cost 
of around 20 cents/kWh (table 9, figure 12). Underpricing has hindered ENERCA’s ability to undertake 
new investment and refurbish its dilapidated infrastructure. But in the medium term, as the structural 
problems facing the sector are addressed and new generation capacity comes on stream, long-run 
marginal costs would likely be on the order of 11 cents/kWh, or within range of existing tariffs 
(figure 12). 
Figure 11. Power prices, benchmarked against other Sub-Saharan African countries 
 
Source: World Bank 2009f; AICD estimates. 
Note: Average effective tariff estimates are based on prices paid by domestic and nondomestic customers, weighted by their 
contributions to total consumption. 
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Figure 12. ENERCA’s average revenue and total costs, 2002–09 
 
Source: Based on Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009). 
Note: Historical cost (both total and operational) is a simple average of ENERCA’s cost between 2002 and 2009. 
 
ENERCA’s revenue collection ratio has worsened over time, decreasing from 88 percent to 62 
percent between 2006 and 2010. A striking 50 percent of the unpaid bills were for public sector entities 
and administrations related to state and local governments (including the town hall/mayor’s office) 
(ENERCA 2011). The municipality of Bangui accumulated arrears of almost CFAF 7 billion ($7 million) 
to ENERCA. As of 2009, the government needed to repay its arrears and assume the domestic 
commercial bank debts of ENERCA. These payments were valued at CFAF 1.7 billion or almost $4 
million (IMF 2009). Paying off this balance will allow ENERCA to strengthen its finances. 
The large system leakages—compounded by ENERCA’s inability to recover power production costs 
and its undercollection of revenues—have led to vast hidden costs,
11 which have worsened over time both 
in absolute and relative terms (table 10). The increase in operating costs from 2008 to 2009 was largely 
circumstantial due to the breakdown of the Boali power plant. 
Table 10. Large inefficiencies drain significant potential revenues from ENERCA 
Year  Power 











  (GWh/year)  (% of 
production) 
(% of 
billings)  ($/kWh)  ($/kWh)  ($ 
million/year)  (% revenues) 
2004  64  50  88  0.14  0.14  5  48 
2005  77  57  88  0.16  0.14  8  84 
2006  65  55  88  0.15  0.14  7  90 
2007  66  53  83  0.12  0.15  6  63 
2008  64  57  74  0.15  0.15  7  76 
2009  72  48  64  0.20  0.15  14  117 
Source: ENERCA 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008, 2011; World Bank 2009f. 
Notes: Collection ratios for 2004–05 were not available, so the 2006 ratio was used. 
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Unaccounted losses (mostly nontechnical) constitute the most obvious challenge, followed by 
collection inefficiencies. Inadequate bill collection has been an increasing burden for ENERCA in recent 
years (figure 13a). Relative to other low-income countries in Central and West Africa, however, 
ENERCA’s hidden costs in 2009 were better than several other countries (figure 13b). 
Figure 13. Hidden costs, as percentage of revenues   
a. ENERCA has massive hidden costs largely due to unaccounted 
losses  
b. Hidden costs are large compared to several countries in Central 
and West Africa 
   
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009). 
Information and communications technologies 
Achievements 
The CAR pressed ahead in its commitment to liberalization and private participation with the creation of a 
legal and institutional environment for the ICT sector. In 1996 the country enacted a telecommunication 
law that provides for the liberalization of the sector; a new sector regulator started functioning in 2004. 
This took place in parallel with and in spite of the ongoing conflict, making it an even more remarkable 
achievement. The country has achieved a genuinely competitive market with no real dominant player, 
except in the landline market. 
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Table 11. ICT indicators, benchmarked against Sub-Saharan African fragile and low- income countries 
     Fragile states  CAR  Low-income 
countries 
Indicator  Unit  2008  2000  2008/2009  2008 
GSM coverage  % population under signal  68  19  50  63 
Mobile phone  subscribers/100 people  20.0  0.3  15.2  24.4 
International bandwidth  bits/capita  47.2  0.06  3.5[1]  24.8 
Internet  users/100 people  2.7  0.06  1.4  3.5 
Landline  subscribers/100 people  0.7  0.3  0.2  0.8 
  
    Fragile states  CAR  Low-income 
countries 
US dollars      2008  2002  2009  2008 
Price of monthly mobile basket  12.0  —  12.4  11.0 
Price of monthly fixed-line basket  16.0  —  13.9  10.4 
Price of monthly fixed broadband  72  —  671[2]  287 
Price of a call to the United States per minute  0.62  4.53  0.62  0.69 
Price of an inter-Africa call per minute  0.74  —  0.62  0.94 
Source: Adapted from AICD, OTH, ART, SOCATEL, Orange, and World Bank ICT At-a-Glance. 
[1] = 2007. 
[2] = 2010, WiMAX. 
— = Data not available. 
 
The country has benefited from a huge expansion in the coverage and access of mobile 
communications. Mobile penetration rose from 0.3 subscriptions per 100 people in 2000 to 15.2 in 2009, 
but is still below the rates of fragile states. Nonetheless, with only around half the population covered by a 
mobile signal,
12 penetration remains behind the levels of comparable Sub-Saharan peers (table 11). The 
intensification of competition since 2004 and the actions of strategic investors from the Middle East and 
Europe in mobile operations
13 should help to boost access. But this may be difficult without universal 
service support, since it is estimated that only around half the population can afford to pay for service 
(figure 14) (Mayer and others 2009). 
   
                                                 
12 Figure refers to the largest mobile operator by subscriptions (Orascom Telecom 2010).  
13 Bintel (a Dubai-registered company) purchased Nationlink, an existing mobile operator in 2007. Likewise, 
Orascom Telecom of Egypt purchased Telecel, another existing mobile operator, in 2008. France Telecom entered 
as the fourth mobile operator in 2007 through its Orange subsidiary. THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Figure 14. Efficient market gap, benchmarked against Central African countries 
 
Source: Mayer and others (2009) using GSM coverage figures as of 2005. 
Note: Existing access represents the percentage of the population currently covered by voice infrastructure as of  the third quarter of 2006. 
Efficient market gap represents the percentage of the population for whom voice telecommunications services are commercially viable given 
efficient and competitive markets. 
Coverage gap represents the percentage of the population for whom services are not viable without subsidy. 
 
The presence of multiple operators in the mobile market (table 12) has contributed to the rapid 
expansion of connections and the impressive drop in prices. Between 2004 and 2009 the number of 
connections (prepaid and postpaid) increased eightfold, from 60,000 connections to more than 500,000. 
The price of an international call dropped 50 percent, from $1.20 in 2004 to $0.60 in 2009. The 
connection charge to a prepaid mobile dropped 76 percent, from $25.60 to $6.30. 
Table 12. Players in the ICT sector 
Market  Mobile  Internet  Fixed line 
Operators  Telecel Centrafrique (1995) 
Nationlink Telecom (2004) 
Moov (2005) 
Orange Centrafrique (2007) 
Telecel Centrafrique  
Nationlink Telecom  
Moov 
Orange Centrafrique  
SOCATEL (ADSL) 
SOCATEL 
Source: AICD and Agency for Telecommunications Regulation (http://www.art-rca.org). 
Note: SOCATEL = Société Centrafricaine des Télécommunications; ADSL = asymmetric digital subscriber line; ICT = information 
and communications technology. 
 
In 2008 the telecommunications sector contributed 5 percent of the overall GDP and was growing at a 
rate of about 40 percent per year. The ICT sector is the most significant fiscal contributor in the country 
and attracted more than $80 million FDI from mobile operators in 2008 and 2009 (World Bank 2009d). 
Challenges 
A number of factors external to the ICT sector have hindered the CAR’s access to and use of modern 
electronic communications, resulting in relatively high Internet prices and low access (table 11, 
figure 15). Among other factors, the CAR’s poor electricity infrastructure and fiber-optic links are major 
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The low level of access to electricity is a major factor constraining telecommunications in the CAR. 
Only 1 percent of households had an electrical connection in 2009 (10 percent in Bangui) and less than 1 
percent of the population owned a computer (Institut Centrafricain des Statistiques, et des Etudes 
Economiques et Sociale 2009).  
Internet costs remain high, pending completion of fiber-optic links to submarine cables. Being 
landlocked, the CAR is reliant on costly satellite VSAT
14 connectivity for international Internet access. 
While there has been significant growth in the Internet market, international Internet connectivity, and the 
number of Internet users (around 3.5 bits per person,
15 or 1.4 users per 100 people; see figure 15a), the 
CAR’s Internet market is one of the least developed in the CEMAC region (figure 15b). The poor 
condition of SOCATEL’s network makes the launch of DSL
16 Internet services unlikely.  
Figure 15. Internet market, 2008 
a Internet ervice trends, Central African Republic   b. Internet service trends, select peers 
   
Source: World Bank, including AICD analysis. 
 
   
                                                 
14 Very Small Aperture Terminal. 
15 International bandwidth was estimated at between 14 to 16 megabits per second (Mbps) in 2007 (World Bank 
2009e).  
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Efforts are under way to establish 
fiber-optic links to undersea cables 
landing in neighboring Cameroon,
17 
which would help lower prices provided 
that there is competition in the 
international gateway (table 13). The 
creation of a Central African Backbone 
(CAB) across the CAR, Cameroon, and 
Chad could provide much of the needed 
capacity. Estimations suggest that the 
opportunity cost of providing bandwidth 
that relies on satellite connection as 
opposed to the CAB network is 
estimated at $117 million until 2021.
18 
In addition, the economic impact on Cameroon, the CAR, and Chad is estimated at $94 million, out of 
which $76 million is consumer surplus and $18 million is producer surplus. Despite these potential gains, 
there are problems surrounding the institutional arrangements and governance of international cable 
access, which, for instance, impede Chad from using its existing fiber-optic links laid along the Chad-
Cameroon oil pipeline. Another identified risk for the CAB is low private sector interest in financing, 
installing, managing, and maintaining the regional network infrastructure (World Bank 2011a).  
Incomplete liberalization and poor infrastructure led to the stagnation of the landline market under 
state monopoly control. SOCATEL, once partly owned by France Telecom, is now fully state owned
19 
and the only player in the fixed-line market. SOCATEL suffers chronic operating losses given its low 
market share in a competitive sector (about 1 percent of the overall subscribers for the 
telecommunications fixed and mobile segments) (World Bank 2009d
 ). Fixed-line subscriptions have been 
stagnant for several years, at about 0.2 subscribers per 100 people (table 11), and 97 percent of the 9,000 
existing lines are in Bangui. On average, only 20 new lines per month are connected to the network. 
Given the shortage of traditional fixed lines, higher levels of ICT access will come through wireless 
technologies. Recently, Orange launched a wireless broadband service using WiMAX technology, but 
prices are still high at $671 per month for a 256 kilobyte per second (kbps) connection.  
   
                                                 
17 The Central African Republic is one of the first three countries selected for the World Bank’s Central African 
Backbone project which will ―support the countries of the Central African region in developing their high-speed 
telecommunications backbone infrastructure to increase the availability of high-speed Internet and reduce end-user 
prices‖ (see http://go.worldbank.org/D1V9Y4SYS0). 
18 Using a discount rate of 13 percent and average annual decrease of satellite connection of 8 percent. 
19 SOCATEL is allegedly facing serious difficulties due to unpaid government bills and disputes over the 
international gateway (Balancing Act 2010). 
Table 13. Submarine cables and competition, ICT prices, 2008 
$  Price per minute during 







Without submarine cable  0.97  0.96  266 
With submarine cable  1.07  0.63  89 
   Monopoly on international 
gateway  1.65  1.11  109 
  Competitive international gateway  0.45  0.28  65 
Source: AICD analysis 
Note: [1] 256 kilobyte per second (kbps) connection. 
ADSL = asymmetric digital subscriber line; ICT = information and communication 
technology. 
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Financing an upgrade of the CAR’s infrastructure 
This section develops a financial framework in which the cost of meeting infrastructure development 
targets is compared against the existing spending levels and patterns to quantify sector-specific funding 
gaps and possible financing sources. After estimating the price tag of achieving preestablished sector-
specific targets, the section examines infrastructure spending in the period 2002–07, identifying main 
sources of financing (public sector, private sector, official development assistance (ODA) from the 
member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and assistance from 
non-OECD states), uses of funds for capital, operations and maintenance (O&M), and the relative 
importance of each sector against the existing budget envelope. Particular focus is given to public 
spending patterns, as well as to the identification and quantifying of inefficiencies in both on-budget and 
off-budget public spending. The section then evaluates—sector by sector—the funding gaps and discusses 
how these gaps might be covered by existing budgetary resources or the extension of the time horizon. 
Estimating sectoral spending needs 
The cost of achieving the CAR’s infrastructure targets, discussed in this section, was estimated using 
sector-specific models developed within the AICD framework. The infrastructure deficit for each country 
was calculated using microeconomic models that take into account both growth-related and social 
demands for infrastructure, and incorporate costs of maintenance, rehabilitation, and expansion. The 
physical infrastructure targets are the grounds for the set of spending estimates. Starting at 2005, for most 
sectors a 10-year horizon was used as a timeline for attaining a number of key social targets for broader 
infrastructure access. Methodologies for estimating spending needs vary according to the characteristics 
of each sector, as follows: 
• Transport. The spending needs model for transport is based on a spatial analysis that assesses the 
costs of linking economic and demographic nodes through transport infrastructures with the objective of 
achieving regional, national, urban, and rural connectivity. The model identified key geographic and 
demographic features of each country, using geographic information system (GIS) data to measure the 
necessary distances. Costs are based on condition, type and standard of investment, and maintenance 
needs.  
• Irrigation. The spending needs model for small-scale irrigation combines spatial information on 
current rain-fed crop production, irrigation potential, and exploitable runoff. The results provide unit 
revenue increases to be expected with the implementation of small-scale irrigation. 
• Water and sanitation. This model builds on the standards methodology developed by the Joint 
Monitoring Program of the United Nations to estimate the cost of meeting the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) for water and sanitation. Estimates were based on minimum acceptable asset standards. It 
was assumed that relative prevalence of water and sanitation modalities remain broadly the same between 
2006 and 2015, and services are upgraded for only a small segment of customers. 
• Power. A dynamic model that combined economic growth and electrification targets was used to 
estimate power spending needs. The model simulated optimal (least-cost) strategies for generating, 
transmitting, and distributing electricity in response to demand increases. It also estimated the cost of THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
35 
 
meeting power demand under a range of alternate scenarios that considered access targets, fuel prices, 
unit costs of investment, and the feasibility of cross-border trade. The spending needs estimation started 
by identifying potential generation projects and their rank according to cost effectiveness. Investments 
included refurbishment of existing capacity for electricity generation and construction of new capacity for 
cross-border electricity transmission. Spending needs also accounted for the O&M requirements of 
existing, refurbished, and new assets. 
• ICT. Spatial models were used to simulate the commercial viability of further expanding coverage 
of voice and broadband signals into uncovered, mostly rural areas, using GSM and WiMAX technologies. 
The models considered the cost of network rollout based on topographical factors and local availability of 
power. They also estimated local revenue potential based on demographic densities, per capita incomes, 
and estimated subscriber rates. Based on the commercial viability, the models calculated the amount of 
investment and recurrent spending required to achieve universal population coverage, meet market-driven 
demand through 2015, and improve cross-border connectivity.  
Infrastructure targets for the CAR and their costs 
To meet its most pressing infrastructure needs and catch up with developing countries in other parts 
of the world, the CAR needs to expand its infrastructure assets in key areas. The targets outlined below 
are purely illustrative, but they represent a level of aspiration that is not unreasonable. They were defined 
based on the current diagnostics of the quantity and quality of the existing infrastructure of each sector, as 
discussed in previous sections. Developed in a standardized way across African countries, they allow for 
a cross-country comparison of the affordability of meeting the targets, which can be modified or delayed 
as needed to achieve financial balance (table 14).  
The CAR needs to achieve transport connectivity with good-quality, one-lane paved roads in fair 
condition. The country needs to meet the MDGs for water supply and sanitation; that is, to halve the 
number of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015. 
Infrastructure development targets specific to the CAR in the energy sector include installing 143 MW of 
new capacity for hydropower generation
20 to increase electrification from 1 percent to 34 percent of the 
population, which implies increasing the number of connections by a factor of 50—from 6,000 to more 
than 300,000. Finally, the country needs to establish a fiber-optic link to Chad to later connect to the 
submarine cable landing in Cameroon. 
Meeting the illustrative infrastructure targets for the CAR would cost $349 million per year over a 
decade.
21 Capital expenditure would account for about 60 percent of this requirement. Transport is the 
sector with the highest spending needs, requiring $160 million per year. ICT is the sector with the second-
highest needs, requiring $86 million per year for the next decade to meet various connectivity targets. 
Around $55 million per year is needed to meet demand in the power sector. About $47 million will be 
needed each year to meet the MDGs in the water supply and sanitation sectors. While smaller than what is 
                                                 
20 As discussed in the power section, for the CAR to achieve this capacity the country would need to build the Boali 
3 (10 MW) and Palambo (300MW), and the country would then produce an excess capacity of around 157 MW.  
21 These estimates do not include the river transport subsector. THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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needed for other sectors, requirements for small-scale irrigation projects are also important, amounting to 
around $1 million a year (table 15).  
Table 14. Illustrative investment targets for infrastructure  
  Economic target  Social target 
Transport  To connect Bangui, cities with more than 250,000 
inhabitants, and border crossings with one-lane paved 
roads in fair condition [1]  
Providing rural road access to the highest-value agricultural 
land, and urban road access within 500 meters 
 
Irrigation   Develop additional 1,824 hectares of economically viable 
small-scale irrigation projects [2] 
 
— 
WSS  —  Achieving Millennium Development Goals of halving the 
population without access to improved water and improved 
sanitation by 2015 
Power  Develop 143 MW of new generation capacity to meet 
national access rate of 34 percent 
Increasing national electrification to 34 percent (84 percent 
urban and 1 percent rural)  
 
ICT  Install fiber-optic links from Bangui (the CAR) to 
N’Djamena (the CAR) to allow for connectivity to the 
submarine cable landing in Cameroon.  
Providing universal access to GSM signal and public 
broadband facilities  
Sources: Mayer and others 2009; Rosnes and Vennemo 2009; Carruthers, Krishnamani, and Murray 2009; You and others 2009. 
Note:  
[1] Regional connectivity is defined as the road network that links national capitals to each other, to all other cities with a population greater 
than 250,000, to international land borders, and to deep-water ports. 
[2] Assuming an internal rate of return of 12 percent. 
WSS = water supply and sanitation; ICT = information and communication technology; GSM = global system for mobile communications. 
— = Not available. 
 
Table 15. Indicative infrastructure spending needs for 2006–15 
$ million per year   
Sector  Capital expenditure  Operations and maintenance  Total needs 
Transport   91  69  160 
ICT  30  56  86 
Power   50  5  55 
WSS  37  10  47 
Irrigation  1  —  1 
Total  208  141  349 
Sources: Mayer and others 2009; Rosnes and Vennemo 2009; Carruthers, Krishnamani, and Murray 2009; You and others 2009. Derived from 
models that are available at http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/models. 
Note: ICT = information and communications technology; WSS = water supply and sanitation. 
 




The CAR’s infrastructure 
spending needs, at 17.5 percent of 
GDP (using 2009 GDP), are among 
the average level for Central African 
countries and lower than comparable 
fragile states. Capital investment 
would absorb around 10 percent of 
GDP, somewhat less than what China 
invested in its infrastructure during 
the mid-2000s. Spending needs for 
O&M account for around 7 percent of 
the CAR’s GDP (figure 16). 
Spending needs in the transport 
sector are mainly driven by needs in 
the road sector, in particular in capital 
expenditure. Whereas road needs 
account for $158.2 million per year, 
needs for the air transport sector are 
only $1.5 million per year (table 16). 
To ensure regional connectivity, the CAR must have access to the Port of Douala. National connectivity is 
provided by a transport network that links each country’s provincial capitals and cities with a population 
of at least 25,000. High capital expenditure on transport is justified by substantial upgrades of the road 
sector ($81.2 million per year). O&M needs are calculated assuming that all transport infrastructure is 
maintained in fair condition.  
Table 16. Transport needs 
$ millions per year 
  Improve 
condition 
Upgrade 
category  Expand capacity  Capital  Operations and 
maintenance  Total 
Roads  8.2  81.2  0.2  89.6  68.6  158.2 
Regional  1.4  42.5  0  43.9  17.9  61.8 
National  0.3  35.4  0.2  35.9  14.3  50.2 
RAI  0.3  3.3  0  3.6  32  35.6 
UAI  6.2  0  0  6.2  4.4  10.6 
Airports  0  1  0  1  0.4  1.5 
Total  8.2  82.2  0.2  90.6  69.1  159.7 
Source: Carruthers, Krishnamani, and Murray 2009.  
Note: RAI= Rural accessibility index; UAI= Urban accessibility index 
 
   
Figure 16. Infrastructure spending needs in the regional context 
As percentage of GDP 
 
Source: Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2009. 
Note: O&M= operations and maintenance; CAPEX = capital expenditure; GDP = gross 
domestic product; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; the CAR = Central African Republic. 
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Spending requirements in the 
transport sector would absorb 8 percent of 
the GDP, above the average requirement 
for low-income countries (4.8 percent 
assuming a similar scenario).
22 Compared 
to the needs of Central African peers, the 
CAR’s transport needs are the highest 
after the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(figure 17).  
Spending needs in the CAR’s ICT 
sector, at $86 million per year, are the 
second largest. Most are associated with 
voice services ($54 million), in particular 
O&M of the existing network. Spending 
needs related to broadband provision 
account for around $ 29 million per year. 
Extending the ICT backbone would cost 
around $3 million per year (table 17). 
The CAR’s power spending needs 
amount to $55 million per year, or 2.7 
percent of GDP. The overall cost of developing the power system appears high, but not unattainable. 
Raising electrification levels to meet national electrification targets (34 percent of the population) would 
entail a commitment of $50 million per year, mainly for expanding the existing generation capacity by 
143 MW (table 18); 18 MW needs to be refurbished.  
Table 17. ICT spending needs 
$ millions per year 
  New investment  Rehabilitation  Capital  Operations and 
maintenance  Total 
Voice  14  1.5  15.5  39  54 
Broadband  10  1.5  11.5  18  29 
Backbone  2  1  3  1  1 
Total  26  4  30  56  86 
Source: Carruthers, Krishnamani, and Murray 2009. 
 
   
                                                 
22 Taking into account the burden of transport spending needs, a pragmatic scenario rather than a basic scenario is 
assumed. For more details on the differences among scenarios (Carruthers, Krishnamani, and Murray 2009). 
Figure 17. Transport spending needs compared to Central African 
peers 
As percentage of GDP 
 
Source: Carruthers, Krishnamani, and Murray 2009. 
Note: O&M= operations and maintenance; CAPEX = capital expenditure; GDP = 
gross domestic product; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; CAR = Central African 
Republic. 
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Table 18. Power spending needs 
$ millions per year 
  Expansion  Rehabilitation  Capital  Operations and 
maintenance  Total 
Generation  28  1  29  3  32 
Hydro  28  1  29     
Transmission and distribution  20  1  21  2  23 
Distribution grid  1         
Urban connection  19         
Total   48  2  50  5  55 
Source: Rosnes and Vennemo 2009. 
 
The CAR needs to spend about $47 million per year (or 2.4 percent of the GDP) to meet the MDG of 
halving the percentage of people without access to improved water and improved sanitation. These 
estimates assume that the new customers will be provided with middle-range water supply and sanitation 
modalities. In particular, in urban areas, new customers will be using standposts and ventilated-improved-
pit (VIP) latrines; in rural areas, new customers will rely on wells, boreholes, and traditional latrines. As a 
result, no expansion of upper-end modalities such as piped water supply or sewer connections is 
envisaged. As the current provision of improved services is low, the CAR needs to make an effort to 
expand and rehabilitate water supply and sanitation assets, at an estimated cost of $36.6 million per year. 
The O&M of existing service would require spending about $10.5 million per year (table 19).  
Table 19. Water supply and sanitation spending needs 
$ millions per year 
  Expansion  Rehabilitation  Capital  Operations and 
maintenance  Total 
Water supply  14.4  10.2  24.6  8.0  32.7 
Sanitation  5.6  6.3  12.0  2.5  14.4 
Total  20.1  16.5  36.6  10.5  47.1 
Source: AICD water supply and sanitation spending needs model, 2010. 
 
To expand the irrigated land by 1,824 hectares through small-scale projects, the CAR would need to 
spend about $1 million per year. The total spending needs for the irrigation sector were calculated 
assuming an IRR cutoff of 12 percent and the investment required for additional land, plus requirements 
for the rehabilitation and maintenance of existing irrigation infrastructure (recall table 6 in the irrigation 
section).  
Spending allocated to address infrastructure needs  
When all traceable financing sources—public sector, private sector, ODA, and non-ODA—are put 
together, existing spending in infrastructure amounts to $134 million per year (table 18). The public 
sector has the lion’s share of infrastructure spending, at about two-thirds of total funds ($87 million). The 
remaining third is sourced externally, mainly by ODA ($43 million), and to a smaller extent, by the 
private sector ($4.5 million). There are no data on spending by non-OECD financiers in the CAR.  THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Table 20. Financial flows to infrastructure 
$ millions per year 
 
Operation and maintenance  Capital expenditure 
Total 
spending  Public sector  Public 
sector  ODA  Non-OECD 
financiers  PPI  Total capital 
expenditure 
ICT  2.5  0.1  2.7  0.0  4.5  7.3  9.8 
Irrigation  —  —  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Power   10.1  11.3  4.0  0.0  0.0  15.3  25.5 
Transport   23.1  35.3  29.2  0.0  0.0  64.6  87.6 
WSS  3.2  0.9  6.7  0.0  0.0  7.6  10.8 
Total  38.9  47.7  42.6  0.0  4.5  94.8  133.7 
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). 
Note: Public sector spending includes central government spending (on-budget) and state-owned enterprise (SOE) spending. Non-OECD 
financiers include China, India, and the Arab countries. 
Financial flows for on-budget government spending are the average of budgeted amounts for 2008–09; various periods are covered in each 
case to maximize data availability for SOEs; 2008–09 average of disbursement is taken in the case of external financiers (ODA, non-OECD, 
and PPI). 
ODA = official development assistance; PPI = private participation in infrastructure; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development; Capex = capital expenditure; ICT = information and communications technology. 
— = Not available. 
 
 In terms of GDP share, the 
CAR’s existing infrastructure 
spending is already quite substantial. 
It devotes around 7 percent of GDP to 
spending on economic infrastructure. 
While this is the most among 
countries in Central Africa and higher 
than the average for fragile states 
(figure 18), it is only half of the 14 
percent of GDP that China has 
systematically invested in 
infrastructure over the past two 
decades. That said, the CAR’s 
spending level represents an important 
effort relative to the size of its 
economy and a still-precarious 
revenue base as the country emerges 
from conflict. 
   
Figure 18. Existing infrastructure spending in a regional context 
Percentage of GDP 
 
Source: Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2009. 
Note: O&M= operations and maintenance; Capex = capital expenditure; GDP = gross 
domestic product; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; the CAR = Central African Republic. 
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Infrastructure spending is skewed toward capital investment (figure 19). Expenditure on the 
rehabilitation and expansion of the existing network absorbs about three-fourths (or $95 million) of the 
total financial flows to infrastructure in the CAR. Operating expenditures account for the remaining one-
fourth (or $39 million) (table 20).  
Operating expenditure in the CAR is entirely covered by budgetary resources and payments from 
users recovered by the stated-owned enterprises (table 20). The transport sector receives around half of 
the total O&M financing flows, mainly channeled to the road subsector.  
Financing of capital expenditure is 
mainly from the public sector. Close to 
50 percent of capital expenditure 
funding comes from the public sector, 
from central and state governments, 
and public enterprises. ODA accounts 
for 44 percent of total capital flows to 
infrastructure. Private sector flows 
account for just 5 percent of total 
capital investment, suggesting that the 
PPI potential, even in the ICT sector, is 
hardly tapped in the CAR. It is worth 
noticing that these figures do not 
capture the amounts invested by 
NGOs, which might be particularly 
important in some sectors, such as 
sanitation. Relative to comparable peer 
states, the CAR is more reliant on 
public investment in the power and 
transport sectors (figure 19). Most of 
the capital flows to the ICT sector in 
the CAR come from the private sector, followed by ODA. 
Public spending is mostly channeled through the central government, in particular capital investment. 
It is particularly striking that the transport and water supply and sanitation sectors do not report any 
significant capital investments financed from own sources. Operating expenditure, on the other hand, is 
largely channeled through public enterprises. SODECA finances around 85 percent of the total O&M 
spending in the water supply and sanitation sectors. Spending by ENERCA represents 75 percent of the 
O&M funds allocated by the public sector in power. The road fund finances around 50 percent of the total 
O&M made by the public sector in transport (figure 20). 
   
Figure 19. Patterns of capital investment in infrastructure 
benchmarked against comparator countries 
Investment in infrastructure sectors as percentage of GDP, by source 
 
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009).  
Note: Private investment includes self-financing by households. Non-OECD 
financiers include China, India, and the Arab countries. 
ODA = official development assistance; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development; ICT = information and communication technology; GDP 
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Figure 20. Patterns of public spending on infrastructure  
Investment in infrastructure sectors as percentage of GDP, by source 
 
 
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009).  
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; ICT = information and communications technology; WSS = water supply and sanitation. 
 
 
ODA flows to the CAR averaged $42.6 million per year and were mainly channeled to the transport 
sector. But while ODA to the transport sector has been volatile over time, the other sectors have 
experienced different trends. The power sector received some development assistance in 2006 but it was 
minimal. ODA flows to the ICT sector have been rather constant, at about $0.1 million per year. Notably, 
the water supply and sanitation sector has attracted an important flow of ODA resources since the end of 
the conflict, reaching a peak of $6.8 million in 2007 and 2008, and declining since (figure 21).  
The CAR has attracted very little 
private finance into infrastructure 
investment compared with its African 
peers. In fact, before 2007 the country did 
not attract any private investment. In 
2007, $12 million went to the ICT sector, 
primarily for the mobile sector. Between 
2008 and 2009 the CAR received just $4.5 
million per year on average (table 20). 
Many African countries have done 
significantly better in this area (figure 22). 
Notable is the absence of private 
investments in the power and transport 
sectors. Countries such as the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Liberia, Nigeria, 
Uganda, Kenya, and Senegal have captured between 1.8 and 2.5 percent of GDP. But in 2008 and 2009 
the ICT sector attracted more than $80 million in foreign direct investment (FDI), most of it from mobile 
operators (World Bank 2009d). 
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Figure 21. ODA commitments by sector  
 
Source: AICD Fiscal Matrix 2011. 
Note: ODA = official development assistance; ICT = information and 
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Figure 22. Private investment in the Central African Republic and select African countries 
Average per year between 2002 and 2007 
 
Source: AICD calculations. 
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; ICT = information and communications technology. 
 
The transport sector accounts for the largest of total annual financial flows to infrastructure in the 
CAR (60 percent, table 20). Spending on maintenance and rehabilitation in the transport sector is only 
one-fourth of total financial flows to the sector. Evidence suggests that countries that spend too little on 
maintenance will end up with larger rehabilitation liabilities, often resulting in the need for emergency 
works to restore the functionality of critical infrastructure. On the other hand, countries with large 
investment programs may have fewer resources left over to address road maintenance needs. This is a 
worrisome finding because if high capital spending comes at the expense of lower maintenance 
expenditure, then the condition of the network will only deteriorate over time (Gwilliam and others 2009). 
The transport sector is significantly reliant on ODA funds, which are mostly allocated to this sector 
(figure 19, table 20). On average around 45 percent of financial flows to transport come from ODA. The 
high volatility of ODA flows has contributed to the volatility of public investment in the sector. ODA 
commitments were reduced during the conflict and reached their peak in 2006, when the peace 
agreements were signed. After 2006 ODA commitments to the sector were severely reduced and have 
been stagnant since (figure 21). 
Spending in the power sector ($26 million) is evenly distributed between capital investment and the 
O&M of existing assets. Most of the spending in ICT ($13 million) has been devoted to capital 
investments as the greatest expansion of ICT services has taken place since the end of the conflict (table 
20).  
Resources in the water and sanitation sectors have been mainly channeled to financing capital 
investment. Total financial flows to the water supply and sanitation sectors averaged $10.8 million, of 
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How much more can be done within the existing resource envelope? 
Around $34 million of additional resources could be recovered each year by improving efficiency 
(table 21). Capital budgets’ low ratios of execution point the way to an easy and budget-neutral increase 
in public investment—if only execution ratios can be raised. The CAR could expand its resource envelope 
by $14 million per year if it raises its budget execution ratios. 
Reducing inefficiencies in infrastructure operations is also a practical and realistic way of making 
more resources available for infrastructure in the CAR. While the CAR needs to devote considerable 
effort to improving infrastructure, it is also severely constrained in what it can spend. The CAR has 
trouble raising domestic revenue and reallocating revenue from other uses that might require structural 
reforms. By contrast, efficiency improvements (that is, the reduction of distributional losses and the 
undercollection of bills) could enlarge the CAR’s availability of funds by $12 million per year, or around 
11 percent of the current spending flows to infrastructure (table 21). Distributional losses in power cost $6 
million per year, and another $2 million in the water sector. Undercollection of bills for electricity 
services could save another $4 million. 
Increasing tariffs to cost-recovery levels could save further $6 million per year: $4 million in power 
and $2 million in the water sector.  
Looking across sectors, power offers the greatest savings—up to $22 million per year—by tackling 
the inefficiencies of ENERCA and reallocating resources within the sector. 
Table 21. Potential gains from greater operational efficiency 
$ million per year 
  ICT  Irrigation  Power  Transport  WSS  Total 
Low budget execution  0  —  3  10  —  14 
Distribution losses  n.a.  n.a.  6  n.a.  2  8 
Undercollection  n.a.  —  4  —  0  4 
Underrecovery of costs  n.a.  —  4  —  2  6 
Reallocation potential within sector  0  0  5  0  0  5 
Total  0  0  22  10  5  37 
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). 
Note: ICT = information and communications technology; WSS = water supply and sanitation  
— = Not available; n.a. = Not applicable. 
Raising capital budget execution 
Budget underexecution is a significant issue in the transport sector, leading to the underspending of 
about $14 million in available funds annually. In particular, in the transport sector underexecution of the 
budget leads to an average loss of $10 million per year.  
Reducing distributional losses and utilities’ undercollection of bills  
ENERCA suffers from high power losses and low bill-collection efficiency. In 2009 ENERCA’s 
distributional losses, at 48.3 percent of production, were almost five times the best-practice 10 percent 
benchmark. If transmission and distributional losses were tackled, it could result in $6 million savings THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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(0.19 percent of GDP). Another $4 million (or 0.3 percent of GDP) per year could be saved by raising 
bill-collection efficiency from 64 to 100 percent. 
Operational inefficiencies are also present in the water supply sector and cost the CAR about $2 
million a year, equivalent to 0.12 percent of GDP, with distributional losses responsible for about 85 
percent of the hidden costs and collection inefficiencies for about 15 percent. The CAR could avoid this 
cost by reducing nonrevenue water from 51 percent to the 20 percent benchmark of a well-functioning 
utility. 
If the CAR tackles the operational inefficiencies in the power and sanitation sector it could expand 
the budget envelope by 0.62 percent of GDP, which is equivalent to almost 70 percent of the contribution 
of infrastructure to the CAR’s economies during the earlier 2000s. The burden of operational utility 
inefficiencies in the CAR is lower than for the benchmark countries (figure 23).  
Figure 23. Uncollected bills and unaccounted losses in power and water utilities, 2009  
Percentage of GDP 
a. Power sector  b. Water supply and sanitation sector  
   
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009).  
Note: LIC = low-income country; GDP = gross domestic product. 
 
Improving cost recovery from user charges 
Underpricing of power costs the CAR about $4 million each year, or around 0.3 percent of the 
country’s GDP. If compared with the rest of Africa, where underpricing of power is commonplace, the 
CAR’s power utility ENERCA is doing better than other fragile, low-income countries. It is estimated 
that the average total cost of producing electricity has been $0.20 per kWh in the CAR, while the average 
effective tariff stood at $0.15, as of 2009 (figure 24). 
In the water sector, average tariffs charged by SODECA, the CAR’s water utility serving Bangui and 
seven urban centers, stand at $0.57/m
3 versus an estimated $1.1/m
3 average cost-recovery tariff. The 
consequent macroeconomic burden of undercharging for water services—at 0.12 percent of GDP—is 
somewhat lower than that for power (0.18 percent of GDP) and is comparatively lower than in other 




























































Collection inefficiencies Unaccounted lossesTHE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
46 
 
 Because of inequitable access to power 
and water services in the CAR, subsidized 
tariffs are highly regressive. Close to 100 
percent of people with electricity or piped 
water connections belong to the top 20 
percent of the expenditure distribution; such 
connections are nonexistent for poorer 
households (figure 25). Only the richest 
quintile has access to piped water. Most of 
the poorest quintiles still rely on surface 
water. This inequitable distribution of 
connections virtually guarantees that any 
price subsidy to these services will be 
extremely regressive. 
Figure 25. Consumption of infrastructure services is highly differentiated by budget, 2006 
a. Mode of water supply, by income quintile  b. Prevalence of connection to power grid among population, by 
income quintile 
   
Source: Banerjee and others 2009. 
Note: Q1 – first budget quintile, Q2 – second budget quintile, and so on. 
Reallocating existing spending within sectors 
About $5 million more than the estimated O&M requirements in the power sector is spent each each 
year. This could be better allocated toward the expansion and rehabilitation of the existing network. 
According  to  estimates,  the  CAR  needs  to  spend  around  $5  million  per  year  on  power  O&M  (see 
table 15) but in fact is spending about $10 million (recall table 20). 
Annual funding gap 
The CAR’s infrastructure funding gap amounts to $183 million per year, or about 9 percent of GDP, 
once efficiencies are captured. While much of this gap is found in the transport and ICT sectors, 
accounting for about 75 percent, the water supply and sanitation sectors account for 17 percent of the 










































Figure 24. Underpricing of power and water in the Central 
African Republic and comparator countries 
Financial burden of underpricing, as percentage of GDP 
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Table 22. Funding gaps by sector  
$ million per year 
  ICT  Irrigation  Power  Transport  WSS  Total 
Spending needs  (86)  (1)  (55)  (160)  (47)  (349) 
Existing spending*  10   0   20   88   11   129  
Efficiency gains  0  0  22  10  5  37 
Funding gap  (76)  (1)  (13)  (62)  (31)  (183) 
Reallocation potential across sectors  0  —  0  0  0  0 
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). 
Note: Potential overspending across sectors is not included in the calculation of the funding gap, because it cannot be assumed that it will be 
applied toward other infrastructure sectors. 
— = Not available. 
*traced to needs. 
**Assuming complete fungibility across sectors. 
 
As can be seen in table 22, the size of the efficiency gains are equivalent to only about 17 percent of 
the total funding gap, suggesting that to meet infrastructure targets the country needs to scale up the size 
of its infrastructure to boost economic growth and provide basic services to its population. This finding 
concurs with the earlier discussion of the potential contributions of infrastructure to annual per capita 
growth, where it was established that most of the growth gains would be due to faster accumulation of 
infrastructure assets.This point also coincides with one of the pillars of the CAR’s poverty reduction 
strategy, which places the emphasis on building new assets. 
The infrastructure funding gap is almost 
equally divided between capital 
investment and O&M (table 23). The 
water supply and sanitation sectors, and—
to a lesser extent—the ICT and transport 
sector have important gaps in funding 
capital expenditure. The largest funding 
gap for O&M is found in the ICT sector 
($50 million), followed by the transport 
sector ($39 million).  
What else can be done? 
Extending the time horizon, 
prioritizing spending, and tapping 
resources outside the budget are 
alternatives to the poor budgetary situation of the government.  
More time 
Extending the time horizon for meeting the infrastructure targets beyond the illustrative 10-year 
period is considered here. Simulations suggest that in a scenario in which a country is unable to raise 
additional finance, the identified infrastructure targets could be achieved within a 40-year horizon 
Table 23. The size and the composition of the funding gap by 
sector, O&M and capital 
$ million per year 






ICT  23   50   73  
Irrigation  —  —  0  
Power   18  0   18  
Transport   22   39   62  
WSS  25   6   31  
Total  88   96   183  
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). 
Note: WSS = water supply and sanitation; ICT = information and communication 
technology; O&M = operations and maintenance. 
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provided that operation and financial inefficiencies are tackled. But without stemming inefficiencies, the 
existing resource envelope would not suffice to meet power infrastructure targets in the foreseeable 
future. 
Prioritizing infrastructure spending 
Given the size of the funding gap, the CAR will need to be strategic in its prioritization of 
infrastructure investments. The sector analysis points to several such priorities: 
•  Ensure existing assets are maintained. 
•  Refurbish existing power and water infrastructure to functioning order. 
•  Take measures to reduce international transport costs and, in particular, the price of diesel, in 
collaboration with the Republic of Congo and Cameroon. 
•  Try to link power sector development to mines. 
•  Reduce telecommunications prices by prioritizing the ICT backbone. 
•  Change how expansions of sanitation services are financed, with the goal of reducing the burden on 
government (for example, through community-led total-sanitation programs).  
Exploring other sources of financing 
The size of the funding gap calls for tapping sources outside of the budget. Under realistic 
assumptions of the scope for spending efficiency gains, there is still a considerable financing gap for 
infrastructure development in the CAR. Finding additional resources from outside the budget would bring 
additional benefits beyond tapping additional financing sources.  
To this end, creative cross-border financing mechanisms (such as for power generation and 
transmission investments) as well as joint transport projects (such as the Bangui-Doula and Bangui-
Brazzaville corridors) are desirable. Attracting private sector investment in the CAR’s infrastructure 
sectors would bring critical technical and managerial know-how on infrastructure development and 
service delivery. But involving the private sector more would require reforms to the legal and regulatory 
framework.  




This country report draws upon a wide range of papers, databases, models, and maps that were 
created as part of the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic. All of these can be downloaded from the 
project website: www.infrastructureafrica.org. For papers go to the document page 
(http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/documents), for databases to the data page 
(http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data), for models go to the models page 
(http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/models), and for maps to the map page 
(http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/maps ). The references for the papers that were used to 
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About AICD and its country reports 
This study is a product of the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD), a project designed to 
expand the world’s knowledge of physical infrastructure in Africa. AICD provides a baseline against 
which future improvements in infrastructure services can be measured, making it possible to monitor the 
results achieved from donor support. It also offers a solid empirical foundation for prioritizing 
investments and designing policy reforms in Africa’s infrastructure sectors.  
the AICD is based on an unprecedented effort to collect detailed economic and technical data on African 
infrastructure. The project has produced a series of original reports on public expenditure, spending 
needs, and sector performance in each of the main infrastructure sectors, including energy, information 
and communication technologies, irrigation, transport, and water and sanitation. Africa’s Infrastructure—
A Time for Transformation, published by the World Bank and the Agence Française de Développement in 
November 2009, synthesized the most significant findings of those reports.  
The focus of the AICD country reports is on benchmarking sector performance and quantifying the main 
financing and efficiency gaps at the country level. These reports are particularly relevant to national 
policy makers and development partners working on specific countries. 
The AICD was commissioned by the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa following the 2005 G8 (Group 
of Eight) summit at Gleneagles, Scotland, which flagged the importance of scaling up donor finance for 
infrastructure in support of Africa’s development.  
The AICD’s first phase focused on 24 countries that together account for 85 percent of the gross domestic 
product, population, and infrastructure aid flows of Sub-Saharan Africa. The countries are: Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, 
South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Under a second phase of the project, coverage was 
expanded to include as many of the remaining African countries as possible.  
Consistent with the genesis of the project, the main focus is on the 48 countries south of the Sahara that 
face the most severe infrastructure challenges. Some components of the study also cover North African 
countries so as to provide a broader point of reference. Unless otherwise stated, therefore, the term 
―Africa‖ is used throughout this report as a shorthand for ―Sub-Saharan Africa.‖ 
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